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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT					
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK					
3		X				
4	In Re the Matter of:	: : 05-44481				
5	DELPHI CORPORATION,					
6	Debtors.	et al., : One Bowling Green : New York, New York : November 29, 2005				
7		X				
8	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS					
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. DRAIN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE					
10 11	APPEARANCES:					
12	APPEARANCES:					
13	For the Debtors:	JOHN W. BUTLER, ESQ. KAYALYN A. MARAFIOTI, ESQ.				
14		Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP				
15		333 West Whacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606				
16	For the Creditors Com:	ROBERT J. ROSENBERG, ESQ.				
17		Latham & Watkins 885 Third Avenue				
18		New York, New York 10022				
19	For the U.S. Trustee:	ALICA LEONHARD, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee				
20		33 Whitehall Street New York, New York 10004				
21	For Russell Reynolds:	CHARLES BOULBOL, ESQ. 26 Broadway New York, New York 10004				
22						
23	For Pillarhouse:	J. TED DONOVAN, ESQ. Finkel, Goldstein, Rosenbloom, Nash				
24		26 Broadway New York, New York 10004				
25	For Bank of America:	PATRICK E. MEARS, ESQ. Barnes & Thornburg, LLP 300 Ottawa Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503				
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2	SOU	THERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK			
3	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:				
4	For Selectron:	KENNETH LAW, ESQ.			
5	ror selection:	Bialson, Bergen & Schwab 2600 El Camino Real			
6		Palo Alto, California 94306			
7	For Wilmington Trust:	EDMADD M EOV ECO			
8	FOI WIIMINGCON TRUSE:	EDWARD M. FOX, ESQ. ERIC MOSER, ESQ. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Nicholson			
9		& Graham 399 Lexington Avenue			
10		New York, New York 10022			
11	Court Transcriber:	CARLA NUTTER			
12	court manscriber.	TypeWrite Word Processing Service 356 Eltingville Boulevard			
13		Staten Island, New York 10312			
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4 THE COURT: Please be seated. 1 2 Delphi Corporation. 3 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, Jack Butler from the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom with my partners, 4 5 Kayalyn Marafioti [Ph.], John Lyons [Ph.] and David Springer, 6 here for Delphi's second omnibus hearing, the hearing scheduled 7 for November 2005. 8 Your Honor, before we begin the agenda, just as a 9 procedural matter, we have filed and served the proposed second 10 amended agenda. The agenda has 32 matters in it. With the 11 Court's permission, we would follow the agenda in the order 12 that it's presented. 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 But I understand from my clerk that you wanted to 15 have one matter be heard in the afternoon? MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, there are many people here 16 17 on the contested evidentiary matter. There are 31 matters that 18 need to be dealt with prior to the contested evidentiary matter 19 and there is an additional meet and confer conference that has 20 been scheduled with the Court's permission between the 21 committee indenture trustee and the debtors and so we'd like to 22 have sort of a time early this afternoon and that way people 23 who are here just on that matter don't need to sit through 24 three hours of other things. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

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1
              The matter you're referring to is the so-called
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    assumption matter?
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              MR. BUTLER: Right.
              The supplier agreement assumption procedures matter,
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   Matter 32, which is the only contested evidentiary hearing on
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    the agenda today.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              I think that's fine to have that additional
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    discussion with the committee.
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              So, those of you who are here on that matter, the
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    supplier contract assumption matter, so-called, are free to
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    leave because your matter won't come on until 2:00.
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, could I also just on the
    record indicate that if there are suppliers who are here who
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    would like to talk with representatives of the debtors, my
   partner, John Lyons, who is right over here will be out in the
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17
    hallway to talk with suppliers about any individual questions
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    or concerns they might have during the morning call.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              Let's give people a bit of time to move out.
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                         (Pause in proceedings.)
22
              THE COURT: Mr. Butler, since the rest of the agenda
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    doesn't have any evidence you can use that seat if you want.
24
    You can bring it down below unless you want to sit there.
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                         (Pause in proceedings.)
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6 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 Your Honor, again, in connection with -- just one announcement we wanted to also make to the Court and we'll be 4 5 submitting a separate order to chambers, yesterday Delphi issued a press release that announced that it and General 6 7 Motors had agreed to accelerate discussions in connection with 8 the matters between General Motors and Delphi that are 9 important to the restructuring in this case. General Motors 10 agreed to provide some interim financial support to Delphi 11 through not going forward with certain price downs that were 12 contractually committed to and the debtors believe that gave 13 them the opportunity to continue if you will on the negotiation 14 track with the principal parties in this case as it relates to 15 labor and human (sic) capital with our principal customer, General Motors, and as a result the company announced that it 16 17 would seek to have an order entered in this Court that would 18 adjourn the date by which the debtors would file an 1113/1114 19 motion from December 16th to January 20, 2006. We have a form 20 of proposed order that would then reset the dates. We've asked 21 the contact at chambers to get dates for the rest of the order 22 and we'll submit that some time before the end of the week for 23 Your Honor's consideration. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 That's fine.

7 1 I think that the one date that's not going to work is 2 the hearing date that you had because I'm going to be gone that 3 week, the week of the 20th of February. So you can pick a date right after that. You can 4 make it the following Monday. 5 6 (Pause in proceedings.) 7 THE COURT: So the one day that doesn't work is the 8 28th which is a Refco omnibus day but the 27th or the 1st of 9 March would work. 10 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 We'll confer and consult with chambers and submit the 12 order. 13 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, now turning to the omnibus 14 15 agenda and the 31 matters now on for this morning's session. 16 Matter No. 1 is the remaining portion of the interim 17 compensation motion originally filed as docket No. 11. The 18 Court has previously established interim compensation 19 procedures through an order entered at docket No. 869. What 20 remains is the presentation of an order establishing a joint 21 fee review committee in this case or a fee review committee. 22 We are in discussions with the U.S. Trustee about the 23 procedures in connection with that. We want to also consult 24 with the creditors committee and just with the press (sic) of 25 activities, the U.S. Trustee asked if we could present this on

8 1 January 5th. 2 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. 3 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the second matter that is on the agenda is a motion for an order approving the debtor's key 4 employee compensation program at docket No. 13. This was filed 5 6 originally on or about October 12th or 13th. It was scheduled 7 for a hearing today. There was an objection deadline as to all 8 parties for November 22nd. That was extended briefly for the United States Trustee. There were some technology problems. 9 10 They have since filed their papers and it has been extended to 11 December 12th with respect to the creditors committee and the company and the committee continue to meet in connection with 12 13 the program and we are asking the Court now to set that over to 14 January 5, 2006. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. BUTLER: The next matter on the agenda, Your 17 Honor, is matter No. 3 which is the final hearing on the claims 18 trading order. This was originally filed at docket No. 29 and 19 there was an interim order approved by Your Honor that has been 20 controlling in this case and continues to control. That is 21 entered at docket No. 126. 22 We're requesting that the matter be adjourned to the 23 January 5, 2006 hearing with respect to the objections filed at 24 docket numbers 76 and 1117 pursuant to an agreement between

those parties and the debtors with a full reservation of rights

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9 as to all parties-in-interest and we are pleased to advise the Court that the matter with respect to the response filed by Appaloosa Management, LP has been resolved. THE COURT: Okay. Are they being treated like the earlier objectants? MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor, I believe that they are. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: There may be some additional matter with regard to Appaloosa but to the extent there is that would also be extended over to January 5th. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda, matter No. 4, is the utilities motion with respect to any objections that have been presented and I'm pleased to report this matter -- this was originally filed by the way at docket No. 41 and Your Honor entered an interim order at docket No. 234 and a final order at docket No. 760. We have been working through the objections that were reserved. As Your Honor may recall, there were a few objectors reserved in that final order. I'm pleased to report that we have resolved the objections with respect to AT&T Corporation, Entergy [Ph.] Mississippi, Inc., American Electric Power, Dominion East Ohio, New York State Electrical & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, The Public Services Electric & Gas Company

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    and the Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation.
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              That leaves, Your Honor, only, I believe, the
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    objection of SBC Communications, Inc. to the motion as the
    only, I believe, remaining objection and that matter, which I
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    believe is docketed at docket No. 559, with the Court's
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    permission, that's being adjourned to the January 5, 2006
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    omnibus hearing.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              In the interim the order is governing obviously.
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              MR. BUTLER: The final order, Your Honor. This is
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    just -- and they're governed by it.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the
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    agenda is matter No. 5 which is the Speckmo [Ph.] Enterprises
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   motion for relief from stay at docket No. 284.
              This is a motion filed to lift the automatic stay.
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    There have been -- this is part of the volume of set off
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    requests, both formal and informal, that have been received.
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    We have not been able to resolve Speckmo's set off request at
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    this particular time but we're working on reconciling it and
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    there's an agreement to adjourn this matter to the January 5,
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    2006 hearing.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next three matters, I
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    will briefly address, although Mr. Berger is handling them and
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11 Mr. Berger can report on the status. I'll just take them 1 2 together and Mr. Berger can report on the status. They're the 3 Schmidt [Ph.] Technology, Gmbh., order to show cause at docket No. 477. The order to show cause was entered at docket No. 4 816. The Lee Company is an order to show cause at docket No. 5 6 699 and the order was entered at docket No. 842 and item No. 8 7 on the agenda, Baer [Ph.] Industries, is the order to show 8 cause, docket No. 774 and Your Honor entered an order at docket No. 1119. 9 10 We're asking these to be adjourned to the January 5th 11 hearing but I think Mr. Berger has an update on these matters. 12 Speckmo Industries, Schmidt Technology MR. BERGER: 13 and Lee Company are all parties that we are in active review 14 and negotiations with. 15 In Speckmo, we're meeting and trying to reconcile pre-petition obligations and claims. Schmidt Technology, No. 16 17 6, Your Honor, asserts status as a foreign vendor. We are at 18 the tail end of the debtor's investigation to determine whether 19 or not Schmidt fits within that definition under Your Honor's protocol, whether or not specifically it has assets and subject 20 21 in the United States to this Court's jurisdiction. If it is, 22 we note counsel for Hirschman (sic) and we think that we'll be 23 able to work through those issues. The Lee Company for the 24 most part is resolved, Your Honor. It appears that we'll be 25 able to submit an order to the Court either before or after the

12 January 5th adjourn date. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next three motions are all -- one is a motion -- I'll just walk through them -- No. 9 4 is a demand exercise set off by Decketer [Ph.] Plastic 5 Products, Inc. at docket No. 799. No. 10 is the Tricon [Ph.] 6 7 Industries, Inc. motion for modification of automatic stay, 8 again, for docket No. 805. No. 11 is the Meens [Ph.] Industries motion to set off pre-petition payment against pre-9 10 petition claims. Another set off matter at docket No. 818 and 11 then, I think, similarly, although it's a slightly different 12 fact pattern, No. 12 is Eclipse Tool & Die, Inc., motions for 13 relief from the automatic stay. All four of these, Your Honor -- the first three deal 14 15 with suppliers and customers of the debtor seeking to lift the automatic stay to exercise rights of set off. The fourth is an 16 17 allegation from Eclipse that it is a valid lienor to the 18 Michigan Special Tool Lien Act. 19 We're reviewing all of these matters with the 20 particular movants and all have agreed to adjourn their 21 hearings to January 5, 2006. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. BUTLER: Matter No. 13 on the agenda is also 24 somewhat similar to Mercedes Benz U.S. International, Inc. 25 motion for relief from the automatic stay. It's filed at

13 docket No. 983 and we're working along the same lines with 1 2 Mercedes Benz. They've also agreed to move their matter to 3 January 5, 2006. Your Honor, matter No. 14 is a little bit different. 4 5 This is Niagara Mohawk matter. This is our motion authorizing 6 the debtors to obtain preferential power rates pursuant to a letter agreement with Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to 7 8 assume it at docket No. 997. 9 This particular transaction -- there's a regulatory 10 matter that requires the consent of the New York Power 11 Authority. They were scheduled to meet on November 22, 2005 12 but the Power Authority has rescheduled their meeting until 13 December. Accordingly, we ask the Court to move to the January 14 5th hearing so we can get that decision first. 15 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. 16 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, matter Nos. 15 and 16 also 17 are motions for set off; one by Entergy and that's for both 18 recoupment and set off. At docket No. 1024 and item No. 16 on 19 the agenda, DBM Technologies, LLC, is another set off motion at 20 docket No. 1042 and as with the others, they have agreed to 21 adjourn these matters to January 5, 2006. 22 The last item on the adjourn docket, Your Honor, is 23 the lead plaintiff's motion for limited modification of the 24 automatic stay. This is docket No. 1063. This is a little bit 25 different, Your Honor. This is a request by the lead

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14 plaintiffs in what the debtors believe is subordinated 1 securities claim litigation to lift the automatic stay to require the production of documents and limited discovery and we're in the process of meeting with them to discuss that matter and have meet and confers during the course of December 5 6 and, therefore, we have asked to move that to the January 5, 2006 agenda with a deadline to file our objection on December 8 29, 2005. 9 THE COURT: All right. That's fine. 10 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, now moving to the 11 uncontested agreed or settled matters, the first one is the Macato [Ph.] USA, Inc. order to show case at docket No. 785. 12 13 That's been handled by Mr. Berger. 14 MR. BERGER: Good morning, Judge. 15 Your Honor set in motion in the early days of the case a procedure by which the debtors could obtain orders to 16 17 show cause to bring vendors before Your Honor; those vendors 18 being those that threaten to disrupt or withhold delivery of 19 goods on account of payment of pre-petition balances. 20 The orders to show cause were designed to bring those 21 vendors before Your Honor to describe why they weren't in 22 violation of the automatic stay and why those funds should not 23 be disgorged.

A number of orders to show cause were filed among

Your Honor's dockets this morning. We're working through all

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    of those orders to show cause toward settlements favorable to
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    the debtor. We reached final agreement with Macato. It's only
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    on the agenda this morning and we have a proposed order, Your
    Honor, that provides in pertinent part that the $966,000.00
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    that Macato extracted from the debtors was repaid to the
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    debtors. Based upon that and the parties' other agreements as
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    to timing of payments for post-petition goods we've come up
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    with a form of order that counsel for Macato has reviewed and
    approved and I have it here for you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              And that's the order that was earlier submitted, the
    proposed order?
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              MR. BERGER: Correct, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right.
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              I'll approve that.
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              MR. BERGER: May I approach?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. BERGER: Thank you, Judge.
              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the
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    agenda is matter No. 19. This is the debtor's motion for an
    order under 11 U.S.C. Section 365(d)(4) to extend the deadline
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22
    to assume or reject leases of non-residential real property
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    filed at docket No. 995.
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              We're asking Your Honor to extend that period from
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    December 7, 2005 to and including June 7, 2007, a date which is
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16 eighteen months from the initial deadline within which the debtors were otherwise required to assume or reject the real property leases. The debtors are parties to approximately 90 real property leases, in most instances as lessee, some 85 of those. In a minority of instances, we have a separate interest and in some cases of a lessor. The debtors have asked that this be entered without prejudice to our rights to seek further extensions and without prejudice to a lessor's rights to seek a shortening of those deadlines for cause. I'm pleased to report, Your Honor, that only one objection was filed to this particular motion by Orricksworn, LLC [Ph.] at docket No. 1123. That matter has been resolved. With respect to the Orricks, they have -- what we did with respect to Orricks is they have agreed that they would be subject to the eighteen month period but that after twelve months they would have the right to file a supplemental objection on or prior to October 1, 2006 and bring the additional six month (inaudible) back to the Court as it relates to them alone. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: And that's the way they chose to resolve that so they have what I would call a springing objection opportunity -- a window next fall.

17 THE COURT: All right. 1 2 Although this is without prejudice to anyone's rights 3 if circumstances change to seek a shorter period. MR. BUTLER: Correct. 4 5 Anyone can come in. The order specifically provides for cause shown under the statute. People can come in earlier. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 In light of the notice given to the landlords and the 9 lack of objections or the resolution of the one objection, I'll 10 grant this. 11 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 Your Honor, we're now moving to matter No. 20, the 13 retention matter. This is the debtor's application to 14 authorize the employment retention of Jones, Lang, LaSalle 15 Americas, Inc. [Ph.], as real estate administrative and transaction service provider. It's docketed, docket No. 996, 16 17 no objections have been filed. 18 Just briefly, Your Honor, JLL provides a large 19 component of professional services to the debtors including 20 maintaining the debtor's real property information database, 21 coordinating all the lease real estate related payables. They 22 deal with issuance of recommendations regarding notice 23 provisions, expiration dates, other actions and they act if you 24 will as a manager of our portfolio. They perform initial 25 evaluations and abstract all real property interests.

provide strategic real estate advisory advise. They perform in-house lease administration. I sort of view this -- having been on site and seen the facility -- that this is a function that is partly outsourced if you will by the debtors to Jones, Lang, LaSalle. They also serve as providing real property purchase and sales services and deal with facility planning and strategy.

It is an extremely important contractual relationship that the debtors have and the application -- we had if Your Honor wanted to hear more, Mr. Sheehan, our vice president in charge of restructuring is here with us today as is James C. Baker, managing director of Jones, Lang, LaSalle, Inc.

But there have been no objections filed, Your Honor, and we'd like to ask Your Honor to consider approval of the retention.

THE COURT: Okay.

I don't have any problems with the retention per se as you said it. It really appears to me to be largely an outsourcing function plus market rates for brokerage services but the order was ambiguous and I've made it clear that the compensation is pursuant to Sections 330 and 331 to be consistent with the motion itself which suggests that.

The only other thing I would say is that given the profit element of the firm's compensation, I assume that there is someone, even though this is an outsourced function, who

19 will review their activities and if the lease portfolio duties 1 2 change significantly, we'll tell them to reduce their staff in 3 case they don't do it themselves. MR. BUTLER: Absolutely, Your Honor. 4 5 Karen Healey [Ph.] is one of the officers of the 6 company and is responsible for facilities management for Delphi 7 Corporation on a global basis. This function reports up 8 through people on her staff to her and I have personally spent time with her on this particular issue. 9 10 I should point out, Your Honor, Jones, Lang, LaSalle, 11 their involvement is relatively new to the company. They 12 replaced another facility manager that had been providing that 13 and it was precisely the oversight function I think Your Honor 14 was concerned about and that is they're interested in just 15 making sure -- the company thought they could improve the management of that dysfunction and that's how Jones, Lang & 16 17 LaSalle came to be. 18 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. 19 So with that small change I'll approve the order. MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 21 Your Honor, matter No. 21 is our motion to authorize 22 the debtors to preserve an option entering into a new power 23 contract for preferential rates with Consumers Energy Company 24 and related power contracts. It's sort of similar to the 25 earlier motion that I talked briefly about that's been

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20 adjourned but this is a request for Delphi Automotive Systems, LLC to assume two contracts with Consumers Energy. First, is a special manufacturing contract dated October 13, 1995, the other is a partial assignment contract dated December 22, 1998. These contracts provide the debtors with the opportunity to receive electrical power for six of their manufacturing sites in Michigan and there are specific terms of conditions set forth in the agreement that the debtors believe are beneficial and by assuming these contracts Delphi Automotive Systems, LLC is entitled to receive preferential rates from Consumers with respect to a new power contracts; power service is to be retained at these facilities and at other potential locations. The debtors believe, Your Honor, that this is another exercise of reasonable business judgment by the debtors. We think it's a very useful way of being able to make sure that we're obtaining power which is a pretty important commodity of our business to power manufacturing sites at as reasonable a price as we can obtain. We've described all of the specific relief in the motion and no objections have been filed. THE COURT: Okay. I have a question about this which is as I understand these contracts are expiring at the end of the year? MR. BUTLER: Some of them are, Your Honor, expiring

and then the way this works with Consumers is to be able to

21 maintain the preferential rates we have to have authority then 1 2 to enter into the new power agreement and so, you're right, as 3 I understand the negotiations -- and they're fairly complicated -- but as I understand the way this has worked in order to be 4 eligible to enter in to the new power contract with them and 5 6 maintain the preferential rates we need to assume these 7 contracts in the Chapter 11 case and enter into a new power 8 contract. 9 THE COURT: My question is is that just something 10 they're saying or have you all reviewed the agreements to see 11 whether they have the right to cut you off that way? 12 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I haven't personally 13 reviewed the agreement. The people working on this believe 14 that this was appropriate and in fact we had specifically 15 Donald Poole [Ph.], who is a manager of the utility supply group was the individual who worked on --16 17 I know. I reads his affidavit and all he THE COURT: 18 says is that, "Consumers Power tells us that they won't do this 19 unless the contract is assumed" but he quoted some language 20 from the Michigan regs. that suggested otherwise. 21 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, my colleague, Mr. Meisler 22 [Ph.], simply points out, who has done more work on this, 23 simply said that Consumers Energy has the rights under their

rate tariffs to make these determinations as to whether we're

eligible to get the preferential rates --

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22 1 THE COURT: So it's not a --2 MR. BUTLER: -- and that's a judgment on their part 3 and this is what's being required. THE COURT: It's not a right under Michigan law to 4 5 the party receiving the rate? 6 MR. BUTLER: I believe that's correct, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Well, is this something the committee has 8 reviewed? 9 MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, to be perfectly honest, 10 the committee reviewed it on an economic level via Messerow 11 (sic) and was satisfied on an economic level but we have not 12 reviewed the specific question that Your Honor is raising. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 Well, of course, they're related because if you don't have to pay the \$3.5 million of cure costs then the economics 15 16 are all the better. 17 MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor obviously read our papers 18 for this afternoon's motion and I apologize that we did not do 19 this with respect to this motion. We simply looked at the 20 economics. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 Is there an actual option in the contract? 23 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I don't believe that there 24 I believe that this was a product of discussions with 25 Consumers Energy. From the company's perspective, what hangs

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    in the balance here is about $10 million a year in preferential
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    rates. So, again, as the committee did, this, from an economic
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   perspective is as we understand the ability to qualify for
   preferential rates in Michigan, this was a pretty
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    straightforward business decision. It's $10 million a year for
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 6
    two to four years of benefits we give up and a much smaller
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    cure payment.
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              THE COURT: Well, the issue is whether you need to
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   make the cure payment to get the benefits. The benefits are
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   great.
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              MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, perhaps we can take a
    break on this one and --
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              THE COURT: I think that's worthwhile --
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              MR. ROSENBERG: -- and look at the legal issues that
15
    Your Honor is raising?
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              THE COURT: It should be fairly evident in the
17
    agreement.
18
              MR. ROSENBERG:
                              It should, indeed, be and --
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              THE COURT: I would think that CEC should be able to
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   point to something that gives them the absolute discretion
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    here.
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              So why don't we adjourn this to 2:00.
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              MR. BUTLER: Okay, Your Honor.
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              Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda is matter
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   No. 22. This is the Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dor
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24 retention as special regulatory counsel. It's filed at docket 1 2 The debtors do in fact rely on Wilmer, Hale -- as No. 999. 3 they're referred to now -- as their special regulatory counsel on a variety of capacities that are described more clearly and 4 5 completely in the retention application. 6 There have been no objections filed by any party to 7 the retention. 8 THE COURT: I'll approve this retention. 9 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 Matter No. 23 on the agenda is the Latham & Watkins 11 retention filed by the official committee of unsecured creditors, filed at docket No. 1086. This is proposed to be 12 13 nunc pro tunc to the date of appointment on October 17, 2005 14 and the debtors support that appointment, Your Honor, nunc pro 15 tunc to October 17th. 16 The committee has given the debtors the opportunity 17 to review the disclosures and the application as to the debtors 18 only through the next hearing on January 5, 2006. The order 19 would otherwise be final as the other parties did not object as 20 of today's hearing. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 Again, I reviewed this as well as the marked interim 23 order and hearing no objections and recognizing the debtor's 24 continuing right through the 5th, I'll grant it. 25 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

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25 Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda, now moving to what had been contested matters and this one we have listed still as a contested matter for a specific reason. Your Honor, the first matter, matter No. 24, is the Rothschild retention as the debtor's financial advisors and investment bankers at docket No. 52. This had been under discussion with the creditors committee. We have reached agreement with the committee on the form of proposed retention. There is a proposed order and an amended restated retention agreement. That also was resolved -- questions that the agent for the pre-petition lenders had -and we now have a form of agreement acceptable to those parties. We have listed this as contested, however, because there was a letter that was received by us by Robert E. Newton from Lockport, New York in which he wrote that he was compelled as a Delphi retiree to voice his objection to the motion and explained his concerns there. I've read that letter. THE COURT: MR. BUTLER: I don't know whether Mr. Newton is

present today in the courtroom or not.

(No response.)

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, having not been present in the courtroom and not withstanding Mr. Newton's letter objection, we'd ask Your Honor to approve the retention as

amended.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let me just ask. Obviously, this reflects review by the committee. Is it the committee's view that for a case of this size this is a market-driven or market-based retention?

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, the committee has come to the conclusion that it is, both in terms of the total amount and in terms of a 328 retention.

If Your Honor compares what we have submitted to you today with our consent to the original Rothschild request, I think you will see that it has been cut back in several respects quite substantially and to the satisfaction of the committee.

There is no question but that the committee would have liked the retention, given the size of it, not to be under Section 328. We would have liked Rothschild to be a completely independent voice in the boardroom fighting for what's best for the estate and we hope they will still do so even though they have a 328 retention but that's a long-winded way, Your Honor, of saying that notwithstanding our preference as to what the market might be, we have to concede that for investment bankers for the debtor and for the committee in significant, large cases, a 328 retention is appropriate and, again, given the negotiation that occurred right through this morning as to what this retention and the order should look like, Your Honor, we

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   are satisfied with it as presented.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MS. LEONHARD: Good morning, Your Honor.
              Alicia Leonhard for the United States Trustee.
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              The United States Trustee would like to say that
    under the protocol for investment bankers in the Southern
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   District, the United States Trustee reserves the right to
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    review the fees for reasonable --
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              THE COURT: Right and that's set forth in the
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   proposed order.
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              MS. LEONHARD: Yes.
              THE COURT: Under Section 330.
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              MS. LEONHARD: Yes.
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              Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: On that score, I don't see anything in
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   here about keeping time records. Has that been discussed?
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              MS. LEONHARD: Your Honor, I believe the protocol
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    calls for investment bankers to keep time records in one half
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    hour increments and if that has been changed, it was done
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    without the knowledge of the U.S. Trustee and without our
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    approval.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              Mr. Resnick, is there --
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I think Mr. Resnick is
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   present in court today and I think Rothschild intends to file
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28 the U.S. Trustee's protocol in these cases. 1 2 MR. RESNICK: Yes, that's correct. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. RESNICK: I think the order contemplates, as we 4 5 have in other cases, that we will follow that protocol. 6 THE COURT: All right. Very well. 7 I had two specific questions and one observation --8 well, one question and two observations; the first is the new capital fee described on Page 7 has a proviso which says that 9 10 "no new capital fees shall become payable in respect of any new 11 capital raised (X) with respect to any debtor-in-possession financing" and then it says, "(Y) from an entity not otherwise 12 13 participating in or not having expressed an interest in 14 participating in a transaction and I was confused why it said 15 "not." I would have thought it would have been that you wouldn't get it if an entity was participating in a 16 17 transaction, for example -- I'm just throwing this out --18 suppose GM provided capital in connection with the plan, I 19 would have thought that would be excluded from the financing 20 fee because that's picked up in the transaction fee. 21 I don't know if that had been focused on by the 22 parties or now. In other words, my view of the new capital fee 23 is that it would apply to something separate from the 24 transaction-related services that are being provided by 25 Rothschild as opposed to this language.

29 So unless the parties have discussed this already? 1 2 MR. ROSENBERG: I believe so, Your Honor, and I 3 certainly don't want to speak for Rothschild on this but I'll tell you what the committee's understanding was when it agreed 4 5 to this. 6 The new capital fee was certainly the single, most 7 controversial piece of the original Rothschild proposal for any 8 number of reasons, not limited to its potentially duplicative 9 nature. So what has been resolved here is (1) they only get a 10 new capital fee at all if they are so designated by the debtor 11 to provide that service and the Court on notice to the 12 committee, etc., specifically approves they're providing that 13 service (sic), but again, the issue is the duplicativeness. 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. ROSENBERG: On the situation that you describe 16 they'll be getting an M&A fee or a completion fee or something 17 of that sort. 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. ROSENBERG: That's why it's written the way it 20 is. 21 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I also think -- I mean this 22 was reviewed and I was just consulting with Mr. Zeiman [Ph.], 23 who reviewed this on behalf of the pre-petition banks. 24 The way this provision operates, I believe, it says, 25 "new capital fees due and payable in cash in closing" and among

30 the requirements is that the capital has to come from an entity 1 2 that's not otherwise participating so I think it's exactly the 3 way you wanted it to read. MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: Oh, I see. I got it. I got it. I read 6 it wrong. 7 You're absolutely right. 8 Okay. 9 My other point was -- it's on the same issue which is 10 the approval of the new capital fee. I think that that's 11 something that should come back to the Court even if the committee is on board with it. I think it should come back to 12 13 the Court. This has sort of an either/or mechanism but I think 14 15 it's -- among other things, it will point to a certain direction in the case and I think it's better to have it aired 16 17 in connection with that process. 18 The last point I would make is that even though this 19 is under Section 328(a) except for the U.S. Trustee, as in 20 other cases, I would expect that if the case is in wind down 21 mode, that is, for example, a plan has been confirmed and you 22 need an investment banker for some purposes but not at the 23 level that you need here that I would anticipate -- and it 24 would be unusual circumstances not to have it -- for there to 25 be some reduction in the monthly fee at that point.

31 1 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, that's our expectation and 2 Rothschild in other transactions has been very cognizant of 3 those --THE COURT: Right. They have in other transactions. 4 5 I just wanted to state that on the record. 6 But with, I guess, that one change then on Page 5 7 about the approval for 4(e) services, I'll approve it. 8 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 Do you want us to adjust the order to require that 10 the new capital fee come back to the Court? 11 THE COURT: Yes, that's fine. 12 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 Your Honor, the next matters on the agenda are matters No. 25 and 26. 14 15 The first was a motion to vacate or amend the early retiree committee order that had been honored. The motion was 16 17 filed -- rather then had been entered -- the motion was filed 18 at docket No. 595 and the order they were referring to was the 19 order Your Honor entered previously appointing a retiree 20 committee for hourly workers. 21 Matter No. 26 on the agenda was the official 22 committee retiree's motion for the appointment of an official 23 committee of retirees dealing with essentially salaried workers 24 and this was filed at docket No. 874. 25 Your Honor, there have been two notices of withdrawal

of these motions. Both have been docketed at docket No. 1295 and docket No. 1312 where the movants withdrew these motions and they withdrew them based, I believe, on the representations we made and the objections we filed to the motion and I think it's useful to just briefly review that on the record here.

First, the debtor stated that neither the retiree committee motion, nor the retiree committee order affected the substantive rights and interests of any non-union retiree including the movants and Your Honor may recall when we filed that motion it was to deal primarily with OPED [Ph.] health care benefits, among other matters, with respect to our hourly workforce which was represented and to go through the process that the statute contemplated on determining whether the unions wanted to actually take that on on behalf of the retirees or whether they wanted a separate committee appointed.

We went through that process, as it went to them (sic) and all the unions have taken on that responsibility but we said at the time that with respect to salaried workers that any committee would be premature because the debtors had not proposed any further reductions in health care benefits beyond those very substantial reductions that have already occurred over the last number of years. The health care benefits for salaried workers are very different than the health care benefits for hourly workers at Delphi.

We also stated in the papers that the international

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unions have agreed to serve as the authorized representatives of the retired hourly employees. We also have stated that we had not determined if and to what extent we would modify retiree medical and life insurance benefits for non-union retirees.

Finally, we stated that if and when we sought a bankruptcy court approval to eliminate or modify retiree medical and life insurance benefits of non-union retired employees, the debtors provide the movants notice of those proceedings. So we'll give special notice to these four individuals but beyond that, Your Honor, if we reach that decision, I think it is more likely than not that we will come to Your Honor and a file a motion for the appointment of a retiree committee to deal with salaried retirees and that's a bridge not yet crossed in terms of reaching a final decision. What we are guided by, as I said, are the very substantial prepetition reductions in health care benefits that have occurred over the last number of years that have already brought down health care benefits for salaried workers into what may be viewed as a competitive norm but we're addressing those issues as we look at sort of everything that's on the drawing board if you would.

THE COURT: Okay.

So they've withdrawn their motions in light of their now understanding the fact that their request was premature.

34 1 MR. BUTLER: Correct, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next motion is the motion of Pillar [Ph.] House, Inc., USA, seeking an order for 4 5 fixing a deadline for the debtors to assume or reject an executory contract at docket No. 917. 6 7 We filed an objection to the motion. There's been a 8 memorandum of law filed by Pillar House at docket No. 918 and this matter is contested. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. DONOVAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ted Donovan of Finkel, Goldstein for Pillar House. 12 13 Your Honor, we're seeking to compel the debtor to set 14 a deadline for assuming or rejecting a rather small executory 15 contract. My client, pursuant to the contract, delivered to the 16 17 debtor's Mexican plant two pieces of equipment. They went 18 there prior to the petition to install the equipment as per the 19 The debtor was not ready for the equipment to be contract. 20 installed and the debtor now, post-petition, has requested that 21 my client complete the contract for which they will pay the 22 \$4,000.00 installation fee as an administrative claim for post-23 petition work, presumably, although that's not even clear but 24 they've made no attempt to assume the contract and pay my 25 client the roughly \$77,000.00 that's due for the equipment and,

Your Honor, it places my client in a very tenuous position because, obviously, if they install it then the debtor can reject the contract and not have to pay the pre-petition services, all of which in essence turns this into the debtor cherry picking that portion of the contract it wants to have done and allowing it to reject the rest of the contract.

It may be, Your Honor, that this is not a particularly important contract as far as the debtor is concerned and the debtor wants to make the decision, that's fine, but, Your Honor, in our conversations with representatives of the debtor and general counsel for the debtor since the filing -- I don't want to say there's been a threat but there's certainly been an implication that if we don't go and install it we'll be liable for whatever damages the company has in being unable to fulfill its contracts because it doesn't have the equipment up and running and, obviously, that could cause my client tremendous financial hardship and risk.

So we're just asking that the Court have the debtor look at the contract, make a decision. It's just not that big an issue and the debtor ought to be able to make a decision fairly quickly or advise everybody that it doesn't need to make a decision quickly and it can put everything off for however long it needs to and in the meantime my client would not have to be responsible for fulfilling its portion of the contract.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, this is an example of where the debtors do not believe at the moment there is any good business reason why the debtors should make a decision about the assumption or rejection of this contract.

As counsel has acknowledged, this is an executory contract. They are obligated to continue to perform under it and we are obligated to pay for their post-petition administrative claims associated with that contract which simply means as it sets out for Pillar House, they have about \$4,000.00 worth of additional work to do. It's work to install the equipment. They're contractually obligated to do it. We will pay them the \$4,000.00 for those services performed and then we will address whether the executive contract ought to be assumed or not ought to be assumed.

They're trying to use this process essentially to have the debtors pay \$81,000.00 or \$82,000.00 for a \$4,000.00 installation job because they're trying to bootstrap their prepetition claim against the post-petition obligation for service and there's really no basis to do that as we certainly understand the application of the statute. In this particular case this contract is not expiring in the near term, there are not extraordinary circumstances --

THE COURT: Well, does it expire when they've installed the goods?

37 MR. BUTLER: It may be fully performed at that time, 1 2 Your Honor, that's a different question. 3 But there's no basis under a 365, as certainly the debtors understand it, for someone who has a contractual 4 5 obligation to install equipment post-petition, which they do, 6 to not perform those services and be paid an administrative 7 claim, be paid for those services rendered. 8 THE COURT: Are the debtors themselves facing a 9 deadline for when this needs to be installed? 10 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, Mr. Sheehan is present and 11 can testify to this. There is, I think, some need to get this equipment 12 13 installed here at the plant that it was delivered to. I don't 14 have the exact deadline on what that would be but they have 15 under their contract an obligation to install it now. 16 THE COURT: Is this something that any talented 17 mechanic can install or do these people have special expertise 18 that only they are necessary to install it? 19 MR. BUTLER: My understanding when I asked a question 20 similar to that, Your Honor, is that these particular -- that 21 the company that provides this equipment have the 22 qualifications to install the equipment. I don't know if we 23 couldn't go find another mechanic, maybe we could, but my 24 understanding is they need to do it and it's a pretty simple --25 (Pause in proceedings.)

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38 MR. BUTLER: As I was saying, Your Honor, I believe that they have the expertise to install the equipment. they're experienced in installing it. The debtors do not wish to take on the obligation of finding someone else to install that equipment and among other things invalidating the warranties and other contractual agreements we have between us and the supplier. This particular question is do they have an obligation to perform? THE COURT: Well, if you reject it do you lose the warranties? MR. BUTLER: We may, Your Honor. I haven't examined I mean that's the whole point. This isn't a time -we're sixty days into our case. This is not the time to assume or reject a contract that we don't believe is affecting if you will the supply chain. This is an example of where the debtors believe somebody is trying to take advantage of the system to leverage their \$4,000.00 installation fee against a \$77,000.00 recovery of a pre-petition debt and we didn't think that's the way 365 operates. They should install the equipment and they should get paid their \$4,000.00 and we'll deal with the other issues later. THE COURT: Well, are you prepared to stipulate that if they're necessary to install the equipment that their administrative claim may be significantly greater than

39 \$4,000.00? 1 2 MR. BUTLER: Well, the contract provides for 3 \$4,000.00, Your Honor, so I'm not prepared to stipulate to --THE COURT: All right. 4 I will grant the motion and give the debtors ten days 5 to decide whether to assume or reject for the following reason. 6 7 As set forth in the <u>Burger Boys</u> (sic) case as well as <u>Adelphia</u> 8 Communications, the Court is to consider on a case-by-case basis in essence the balance of harm to the debtor and the 9 10 contract party. 11 Normally, that balance tips decidedly in favor of the However, in the unique circumstances of this motion 12 debtor. 13 where in essence the debtor would be forcing the contract party 14 to work through the completion of the contract so that it is no 15 longer executory, I see no meaning in the provision of the Code 16 that permits a contract party to seek to compel assumption or 17 rejection of an executory contract if in fact I granted the 18 debtor's objection here because in essence the contract would 19 be no longer executory at that point and, clearly, in my mind 20 the debtors would have been leveraging the contract party to 21 complete performance for only \$4,000.00. 22 Now, it may well be that in those ten days the debtor 23 can find someone that will do this for \$4,000.00 or even 24 slightly more and I think that's the type of flexibility that 25 in these circumstances Congress had in mind as opposed to

40 requiring full performance under these circumstances. 1 2 So the debtors have ten days to decide whether to 3 assume or reject. Thank you, Your Honor. 4 MR. BUTLER: MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 I'll submit an order. 6 7 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the 8 agenda is matter No. 28. Russell Reynolds & Associates, Inc. 9 This is a motion in which we have an alleged executory contract 10 which Russell Reynolds would like to have a deadline fixed in 11 which they must assume or reject an employment recruiting 12 contract between Russell Reynolds and Delphi. Russell Reynolds 13 is an executive recruiting services firm. They were retained 14 by the debtors to solicit and vet individuals for employment by 15 the debtors as the particular position they're looking for is something called the director of global architecture and 16 17 infrastructure. They are in the process of implementing that 18 search. 19 Pursuant to the agreement, Russell Reynolds was to 20 receive one-third of the total compensation paid to the 21 candidate hired and that was a minimum fee -- rather, against 22 that one-third, sort of a third of the compensation, they got a 23 minimum fee. The minimum fee is \$106,000.00. It was to be 24 paid in three monthly retainers. They got one of those three 25 retainers paid pre-petition, the others got not paid and were

caught up in the pre-petition amount.

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They have not yet completed the search. Our view is they should continue to complete the responsibilities under the search and unlike, Your Honor, the last motion the debtor's view here is that if in fact they complete the search and place someone to the satisfaction of the debtors they will earn the fee for the completion of that placement post-petition against which they'll simply be crediting less of a credit then they might have otherwise gotten as a minimum fee. But if they never complete the search and they never perform post-petition administrative services for the debtors to result in that value to the estate, then they will end up having an unassumed executory contract which we'll deal with at some time but if it's rejected, for example, they'll have whatever claims they'll have but that will be for the minimum fee. think we should bootstrap the minimum fee into an administrative expense.

Our view here is they should go complete the search. We get the quality candidate, that is clearly an administrative expense against which the other matters would be credited.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOULBOL: Good morning, Your Honor.

Charles Boulbol for Russell Reynolds Associates.

As counsel pointed out, there is an executory contract between Russell Reynolds and the debtor. The

threshold issue presented to the Court is does the debtor and Russell Reynolds have the authority of the Court to proceed under this contract?

The position that is sought to be filled, the salary level that is being discussed is about \$300,000.00, maybe a little more per year. There was a candidate interviewed by the vice chairman of the company yesterday so we are making significant performances on behalf of the debtor post-petition and if that person is hired -- and there's also a back-up candidate, I understand -- there will be complete performance of the intent of the agreement which is for Russell Reynolds to deliver someone who will ultimately become the chief information officer of the company.

Now, when Russell Reynolds goes out to find people to take these positions, they didn't go out to find a person to take this position for a bankrupt company. So the debtor has completely altered the landscape under which we are proceeding. Nevertheless, we have continued to perform. The cases make very clear that our only alternative is to come to court and ask for the contract to be assumed or rejected, assuming the Court agrees that the debtor is able to proceed without prior Court permission. The cases make pretty clear that real estate brokers have to be retained by the Court, investment advisors and the work that Russell Reynolds does is essentially indistinguishable from the work that real estate brokers and

investment advisors do.

Under the terms of the contract Russell Reynolds intends to have the position filled in about a three to six month period. We're in that window now, although, we did agree to continue the search until it was completed. Of course, now the debtor has altered the landscape but, nevertheless, we seem relatively confident that the job is going to be done but, again, Your Honor, if Russell Reynolds is a professional, its status must be decided now.

There are too many cases out there of real estate brokers who made the application after the property was sold for us to have any comfort that we have the right to proceed which we have, nevertheless, done at the insistence of the debtor.

The only case I've ever found that even remotely approaches the situation that Russell Reynolds finds itself in is In Re: Monarch Capital, 163 BR 899. In that case, an exclusive financial advisor entered into a letter agreement regarding the sale of the debtor's holdings in another company. It was a success fee based fee which is essentially what Russell Reynolds has agreed to here.

Now, counsel says Russell Reynolds gets paid only if it's successful. Well, that's not what our contract says. Our contract says Russell Reynolds gets paid without regard to the results of the search. That's the first point.

The second point is the debtor needs this position filled now. It is a critical position in the debtor's reorganization. So for the debtor to take the position that, "Well, we'll decide what to do about Russell Reynolds after Russell Reynolds completely performs under the contract," is completely unreasonable.

Now, the Court in <u>Monarch</u> noted that Putnam, the investment advisor, should have been the subject of a retention order and it explained that in great detail but because the debtor forced the investment advisor to continue, the Court ruled that there were post-petition performances by the investment advisor that were entitled to administrative priority and it described how that came about.

Russell Reynolds is not here saying, "We want to get paid today, we want to get paid tomorrow." What we're here today saying is, "We need to know what our status is legally under the Bankruptcy Code because it's unclear." There has never been a case to decide the issue of whether an executive search firm must be specially retained.

I can tell Your Honor that twice in the last year for Russell Reynolds in the District of Delaware we've gotten retention orders and I have gone to fee application hearings with my client in Delaware where we walked out of there saying, "Thank goodness we had a retention order." Russell Reynolds doesn't keep time sheets. They don't keep contemporaneous

records of individual work done. We vet the universe and we try to find successful candidates and that's what we're doing and that we're successfully, so far, doing for the debtor here but the debtor is taking the position that, "We'll wait and see how we treat Russell Reynolds after they complete performance."

THE COURT: Well, no, I heard Mr. Butler say that if they hire the individual that you will be paid.

MR. BOULBOL: Well, we'll be paid what is the first question? What are they going to say? They'll say the prepetition is different than the post-petition. The fact of the matter is we have a fee for finding a candidate that was made - if the search was unsuccessful we're still entitled to our fee so the question for the debtor is assume the contract or reject it.

If they reject the contract we just simply stop working and we have a general unsecured claim. If they want to assume the contract and we completely perform which we're basically on the verge of doing and even if it is unsuccessful and the debtor decides, "Oh, we can't get anybody or we don't want anybody or this position needs the Court approval to be filled," we're still entitled to our fee and right now we're entitled to a fee -- actually, in the Monarch case the Court said that it was unjust to allow Putnam to only recover for its expenses because I think that's what the debtor's position will be here because our contract says we get to bill them post-

46 petition -- well, we get to bill them for the expenses we incur 1 2 in bringing candidates to interview and flying them out to 3 Michigan and that sort of thing. THE COURT: Frankly, my experience has been that 4 5 firms like Russell Reynolds don't get retained in bankruptcy 6 cases formally. 7 Does the U.S. Trustee have a position on this? 8 MS. LEONHARD: Your Honor, I believe to my knowledge, a firm like this has never been retained so I think it's 9 10 probably not appropriate. 11 THE COURT: The two cases you mentioned in Delaware, I think, represent a change in the practice that I was familiar 12 13 with -- now, three or four years ago but -- it sounds to me, 14 though, what you're seeking is really different than compelling 15 assumption or rejection of a contract, it's either to file a 16 retention application or to have assurance that you will have 17 an administrative claim for your client's services. It's one 18 or the other, I think, as opposed to compelling assumption or 19 rejection of the agreement which doesn't really fit into either 20 approach, it seems to me that could be given here. 21 MR. BOULBOL: Well, if the Court approves assumption 22 or rejection of the contract then our status is solidified. 23 THE COURT: Well, I know, but I would never approve 24 the assumption or rejection of, say, Rothschild's pre-petition 25 agreement. They are clearly -- I'm just using it as an example

47 -- a professional that would be retained under 327 as opposed 1 2 to them moving in front of me to compel assumption or rejection 3 of their contract. That would be rejected by me automatically. So, I think what you want here is reasonable comfort 4 5 that you'll be compensated appropriately for -- or your client 6 will be appropriately compensated for its services under 503(b) 7 and you've heard the U.S. Trustee, I don't think you will be 8 barred from that, and you've heard me, too, I don't believe your client will be barred from that because there's been no 9 10 retention order and as far as the measure of the compensation 11 is concerned, the contract is presumptively the measure of that compensation but if, for example, you're unsuccessful in 12 13 finding a candidate, I have the flexibility to move off of that 14 but that's the way 503(b) works. 15 So, I'll deny the motion but, I believe, you can give Russell Reynolds the comfort that they will have an allowed 16 17 503(b) claim for their post-petition services if they're 18 successful. Presumptively, it's measured by the contract but 19 that's subject to the case law in 503(b) generally. If they're 20 unsuccessful, I imagine there will be some claim but we'll see 21 what it is. 22 MR. BOULBOL: Thank you very much. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. BUTLER: Matter No. 29 is Bank of America's 25 Leasing and Capital, LLC's motion for adequate protection filed

48 at docket No. 1022. 1 2 There were several objections filed; one by Pentastar 3 [Ph.] Aviation at document No. 1251, one by the debtors at docket No. 1269 and Bank of America filed a response at docket 4 No. 1284 and Mr. Berger is handling this matter for the 5 debtors. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. MEARS: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Mears. 9 10 MR. MEARS: Thank you very much. 11 Your Honor, my name is Patrick Mears. I'm an 12 attorney with Barnes & Thornberg, LLP based in Grand Rapids, 13 Michigan. I am representing Bank of America, N.A., which is 14 the lessor of two corporate aircraft to Delphi Automotive Systems Human Resources, LLC and I'll refer to that company as 15 16 Delphi HR throughout. 17 This is the preliminary hearing on the Bank of 18 America's motion for adequate protection and relief from the 19 automatic stay. It was filed on November 11th of this year. 20 The Court has not yet scheduled a final hearing. Two 21 objections to the motion have been filed as noted in the 22 agenda; one by the debtors and one by Pentastar Aviation, LLC. 23 Bank of America has responded to the two objections 24 separately. I note that the response to the Pentastar 25 objection is noted in the agenda, the response to the debtor's

49 objection is not. 1 2 I read both. THE COURT: 3 MR. MEARS: Okay. Great. Thank you very much. Now, just some background facts and if you're 4 5 familiar with the papers I'll keep this relatively short. 6 Basically, these two aircraft are managed by 7 Pentastar and there is two charter agreements with a Pentastar 8 affiliate named Automotive Air Charters, Inc. and as we understand it Automotive Air Charters, Inc. charters the two 9 10 aircraft to third parties during the times during which Delphi 11 is not using them. Automotive Air Charter then pays Delphi HR a fee after, I think, deducting a certain percentage amount 12 13 which we have been advised by the debtors amounts to 14 approximately \$80,000.00 per month which is not an 15 inconsiderable sum. I think the primary facts involved are fairly 16 17 straightforward. They don't appear to be disputed, although 18 there may be certainly disputed facts as we go forward, but I 19 would note that neither the DIP lenders nor the creditors 20 committee have filed a separate objection to this motion. 21 Now, really, what we're talking about here is 22 primarily the cash collateral generated by the charter 23 agreements and also any cash collateral that might be generated 24 by the management agreement or any subleases. 25 It's clear that that cash collateral has been carved

out of the debt. It's not subject to any liens in favor of anyone else other than Bank of America and what we've gotten down to -- and there have been negotiations as the debtor has stated in its objection, there have been long negotiations about the resolution of this motion and what it's really come down to primarily is a dispute over whether or not Bank of America should be entitled to receive replacement liens under Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code as adequate protection of its security interests in those revenues, not only the ones in existence now but also to be generated in the future.

It is conceivable, based upon the debtor's track record and entering into agreements without Bank of America's knowledge concerning the charter agreements that the debtor could enter into a new charter agreement with someone else without our knowledge or consent and then take the position, conceivably, or someone else can take the position, conceivably, that the revenue generated from those new charter agreements does not constitute property that's subject to our lien. It's not products or proceeds.

It's also possible, although I don't think the debtor has said this yet, that someone might say that a charter entered into between Automotive Air Charters and X on March 31, 2006, even though done under the existing charter agreement, could be free and clear from our post-petition efforts.

The point is that the dollars are significant enough

51 that Bank of America does not wish to face these issues in the 1 2 future and it really is primarily concerned about getting a 3 replacement lien in future revenues and also in future 4 agreements. It is important also to note that the leases have not 5 6 yet been assumed or rejected. The debtor has not yet made any 7 post-petition payments to Bank of America, though, it is using 8 the aircraft and we understand that there are post-petition 9 charters being entered into. 10 THE COURT: Isn't the debtor offering to make -- this 11 was something I was a little confused about. The debtor seemed to be offering to make post-12 13 petition payments but what B of A was asking for didn't seem to 14 include post-petition payments. 15 MR. MEARS: No, what the debtor offered was in the 16 context of, really, a global settlement. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. MEARS: As I understand the offer, there would 19 have been a pro-ration made as of December 6th which is the end 20 of the sixty day so-called grace period under 365(d)(10), that 21 that amount would have been paid and the debtor would have 22 continued to make future lease payments but the debtor is 23 reluctant, unwilling, to give us a replacement lien in the 24 charter revenue. 25 It is conceivable that the leases could be rejected,

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that because of the rejection we would then have to liquidate the aircraft and that we could end up, based on our estimates done earlier this year that we could have a multi-million dollar shortfall. At that point the only way we could cover that shortfall is by recourse to this cash collateral that has been building up, presumably, and hopefully been paid over to Bank of America in reduction of its claims. But in any event, that's been the nub of the issue. THE COURT: Okay. Now, I'm right, though, that there's no concession that these are true leases. Right? MR. MEARS: The first we heard of that was the reservation of rights contained in the debtor's objection. THE COURT: Okav. I don't understand, though, why -- assume that the debtor can adequately protect B of A for the use of the airplane and for its depreciation and value which is, arguably, something approaching the lease payments. Why is B of A entitled to adequate protection in the form of a replacement lien for its interests in the charter agreement -- it's lien on the charter agreement? Assuming that the debtor doesn't use the cash collateral that's generated by that charter agreement. MR. MEARS: Because it's conceivable that the debtor could enter into a new charter agreement and whatever small

amount -- that could be done tomorrow or relatively soon.

53 THE COURT: But why does that leave B of A 1 2 inadequately protected in respect of its lien on the charter 3 agreement? MR. MEARS: Because if there's a rejection of the 4 5 leases and a liquidation of the collateral we will have a 6 substantial shortfall based on our estimate of the market right 7 now. 8 THE COURT: But that doesn't reflect the decline in 9 value during the post-petition period, that's just a reflection 10 of the value of the collateral. 11 Remember, I prefaced my question by saying, "assume 12 that the debtor is paying you for the post-petition use of the 13 planes under the lease." MR. MEARS: Assuming that all charter revenues are 14 15 being escrowed and not used by the debtor? 16 THE COURT: Yes, that's what they're proposing. 17 MR. MEARS: And that we would then not be prohibited 18 -- if, indeed, the debtor entered into a new charter agreement 19 we would not be prohibited then from asking for additional 20 adequate protection? THE COURT: 21 Well, I am assuming they would have to 22 give you notice of their entry into a new agreement. 23 MR. MEARS: I hope so. 24 THE COURT: Since you have a lien on the plane and 25 the charter assumes the use of the plane.

54 I don't know whether you'd be entitled to adequate 1 2 protection at that point but we'd see at that point. 3 MR. MEARS: Well, the only other point is if you analogize the charter payments to rents, I mean this is a 4 5 wasting asset. If the debtor uses that money in the course of 6 its Chapter 11 case it's gone. 7 THE COURT: But as I read it they weren't proposing 8 to use it, they're proposing to leave it aside until further 9 determination that you're adequately protected even if they do 10 use it. 11 MR. BERGER: That's correct, Judge. 12 THE COURT: So, in a way I thought you won when I 13 read what they were offering. 14 MR. MEARS: Well, the concern --15 THE COURT: I appreciate your notice issue but given 16 that a new charter would be using either a plane you own or 17 that you have a lien on or that you own and they're leasing 18 from you, I can't imagine how they couldn't give you notice. Ι 19 mean I would think that the other party of the charter would 20 insist that the potential owner of the plane or the person that 21 has a lien on the plane would get notice of the new charter. 22 MR. MEARS: Well, with those remarks I guess all I 23 can suggest is that this Court schedule a final hearing and 24 then in the meantime --25 THE COURT: You can work out the details of an

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    agreement.
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              MR. MEARS: -- we would attempt to reach a
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    settlement.
              THE COURT: And I don't know if Pentastar is here but
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   given the factual issue that you raised in your response, that
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    seems to me to be something that should be addressed at a final
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   hearing, too, which is whether they have any right to assert
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    what they're asserting or not but given that what the debtor is
    offering is, I assume, something they would agree with, I'm
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    assuming that would get resolved also before the final hearing.
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              So should we put this on for the 5th of January?
              MR. MEARS: The 5th of January is fine, Your Honor.
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              Thank you.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okav.
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the
    contested non-evidentiary docket is matter No. 30, Censis
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    Precision Diecasting, Inc. [Ph.]. Their motion directing the
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    debtors to determine within thirty days whether to assume or
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    reject their executory contracts with Censis Precision
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    Diecasting, Inc. at docket No. 1028 and we have filed an
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    objection, Your Honor. This matter is contested.
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              MR. MOSER: Good morning, Your Honor.
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              Eric Moser of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, appearing on
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    behalf of Censis Diecasting.
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              If I can begin with a preliminary matter.
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56 I was called in to replace lead counsel on this matter approximately ten minutes ago so I have not had a chance to file a pro hac vice motion. I would request the Court's indulgence. I'll take care of that as soon as I leave this afternoon. THE COURT: Okav. MR. MOSER: In a nutshell, Your Honor, Censis Precision Diecasting has a number of long-term supply contracts with Delphi. Delphi is far and away Censis' largest customer and as a result, the outstanding arrearages under the contract on a pre-petition basis and also the uncertainty going forward on a post-petition basis caused a significant amount of distress to their allocation determinations regarding the present use of their assets. Accordingly, we have asked the Court to impose a deadline on Delphi, requested thirty days to make a determination as to whether they will be assuming this contract or not. I can run through the factors in that analysis if the Court would like but I believe they're fairly set forth on our papers. There is a small dispute, apparently, regarding the calculation of the post-petition amounts due under the contract. I understand that the debtor has been making some payments, although, in Censis' view those are inadequate and

57 1 based on an inappropriate modification of certain aluminum 2 commodity costs. 3 Under the circumstances, given the fairly modest amounts at issue, approximately \$2 million, I believe, are 4 5 currently outstanding. We think that this would impose 6 relatively little burden on Delphi to make a determination to 7 assume this contract and based on the information that I have -8 9 THE COURT: Isn't it a lot of contracts? Isn't it 10 like thirty contracts? 11 MR. MOSER: It is a large number of contracts although the amount due is relatively small. 12 13 It's of great importance to our client and it's 14 relatively insignificant in the context of the larger case. 15 THE COURT: Do these contracts have the termination 16 for convenience language that is sort of the customary Delphia 17 terms? 18 MR. MOSER: I believe that they do, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. MOSER: As I said, in a nutshell, Your Honor, we 21 believe this would impose relatively little burden on Delphi to 22 make a determination regarding these contracts in a modest 23 period of time. Thirty days is what we've asked and it imposes 24 a significant burden on our client to endure the uncertainty 25 associated with having their largest customer contracts

58 outstanding and unassumed during the interim period. 1 2 Apart from that, I'll stand on our papers, Your 3 Honor. THE COURT: 4 Okay. 5 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, as Your Honor recognized, 6 this motion involves obligations surrounding two long-term 7 contracts and several blanket purchase orders so there are 8 multiple agreements here. 9 I think the total amount of annual sales between 10 Censis and the debtors is about \$25 million and this is an 11 example of a contract that we are prepared to perform in the 12 interim basis post-petition but haven't made a final decision 13 about what's going to happen long-term in dealing with this and this is -- I don't think Your Honor can look at the Censis 14 15 contracts -- there's another motion following it which is a similar one -- in a vacuum or in a void because behind Censis 16 17 there are thousands of suppliers who have similar arrangements 18 and we're going to be dealing with that a little bit this 19 afternoon in the contracts that are coming up in the shorter 20 horizon where we risk the loss of supply. 21 Here with Censis, the debtors don't risk any loss of 22 The debtors are prepared to perform under the contract supply. 23 in terms of paying the amounts for post-petition services that 24 are goods that are delivered to them. 25 I don't believe that an issue of allocation

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determinations, which is the harm that is being suggested here by the movant, comes anywhere close to the legal standards that we'd suggest that they would have to compel some type of early assumption and the debtor's general position with all of these, Your Honor -- I mean Your Honor understands we think the supply chain is extremely important, we think it's probably the major value driver of this Chapter 11 case. We are completely sensitized to dealing with the supply chain but the debtors do not believe that they should be making assumption or rejection decisions regarding long-term contracts that come up in June or December of next year until the case proceeds down the line and there's more clarity about what we should be doing as it relates to those transactions. There's no, we don't believe, any real benefit to the estate, in fact we believe the estate is harmed by forcing an early assumption and an early cure of outstanding amounts as far as cure payments go for long-term contracts in which the debtors believe performance is required and as Your Honor noticed from Mr. Berger's presentation of motions, the debtors launch of the Chapter 11 cases has been quite successful with the supply chain in requiring the people under their obligations under the agreements and the so-called -- I guess we agreed not to use the word "rogue" -- nonconforming suppliers.

You saw an example today of someone who, based on the procedures Your Honor permitted, are in fact giving back money

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to the estate that they otherwise compelled us to deliver to them to maintain the supply chain.

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So in sum, Your Honor, the debtors with respect to this motion think it is premature to make a decision about this and to impose a cure obligation payment on the estate. simply point out, Your Honor, that if Your Honor were to grant this particular motion because of the vendors' concern suppliers concern about allocation determinations, I think you will virtually guaranty a thousand similar motions for the next hearing or a hearing shortly thereafter because if that's the standard in which the 2006 and 2007 renewals can be forced and they can get 100 percent cure payments for it, I'm sure people would find that a much more preferable way to proceed in this case then deal with the kind of measured response that we'll be dealing with this in the proposal this afternoon where we have contracts that have a shorter horizon that we want to renew for a series of years and that have implications on the supply chain -- immediate implications.

Your Honor, we believe the primary reason that it's premature and that there's no extraordinary harm imposed on this vendor, we would ask Your Honor to deny the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, this one is of sufficient precedential value to us or potential harm, I might add, that I will rise in support of the debtor's position on this one and,

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61 indeed, without agreeing at all with what the debtor said with respect to the motion this afternoon, payments or cure and assumption of a long-term contract where there are no immediate issues or risks involved is simply unwarranted and would simply open the flood gates for thousands and thousands more which is simply not justified on the facts. THE COURT: Okav. Do you have anything to say, Mr. Moser? MR. MOSER: Just briefly, Your Honor. I can't speak to what thousands and thousands of suppliers might do tomorrow and it seems to me that in this case many amounts of money have been set aside for substantial but discrete groups of vendors. I think the case law calls for the Court to balance the harms and in this case Delphi is, proverbially speaking, the 800 pound gorilla who has the vast majority of the leverage in the relationship so we're exposed to a great deal more harm by the uncertainty than another vendor might be if they did not have that largest customer relationship. Beyond that I have nothing to add. THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny this motion to compel assumption or rejection. Again, applying the factors laid out in <u>Burger Boys</u> and other cases including Adelphia Communications in balancing

the harm between the debtor and Censis as well as the status of the case and particular concerns pertaining to that status as it relates to these contracts and other contracts like it, it seems to me that the debtor should have unfettered right at

this time to decide whether to assume or reject some or all or

6 none of these agreements.

Censis is an important supplier to Delphi and these are not easily analyzed agreements. I note that the motion had exhibits A through I listing all the contracts and, consequently, I think that the debtor should be given more time to analyze the agreements. Secondly, while there was a suggestion that Delphi was not performing all of its postpetition obligations when the dispute was actually discussed in detail, it appears to me more likely than not that Delphi is right on the dispute and not Censis, given my review of the actual agreements which seem to contain the pricing provision that Delphi is relying on. So Delphi does appear to be performing post-petition.

Last, as far as any particular harm to Censis caused by being in the assume or reject limbo I note, first, that only in respect of one of the contracts -- the tooling contract -- did Censis allege that there was some significant advance capital outlay or planning to be had, although that wasn't really amplified beyond that general statement and, second, I note that as confirmed today, these contracts all have the

63 termination for convenience language in them which in essence 1 2 shifts much of the risk on to the supplier anyway from Delphia 3 and weighing all of those factors it appears to me that the motion should be denied. 4 Thank you, Your Honor. 5 MR. MOSER: 6 Could I just clarify that the Court was not ruling on 7 the post-petition pricing issue? 8 THE COURT: No, I'm not ruling I'm just saying as far as ongoing performance that that factor is concerned, it 9 10 appeared to me that the debtor had the better argument there. 11 MR. MOSER: I just wanted to preserve our rights if in fact that should turn out to be a more contentious issue. 12 13 Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okav. 15 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter and the last matter on this part of the agenda is the Selectron Manufacturer 16 17 de Mexico, S.A. motion filed at docket No. 1087. 18 This is a similar motion to fix a time to assume or 19 reject the time for assumption or rejection of the executory 20 contract. 21 Selectron is a provider of electronic manufacturing 22 integrated supplying chain services to Delphi. The contract at 23 issue is a long-term supply and manufacturing contract whereby 24 Delphi purchases goods, components and products. 25 It's a requirements contract and with installment

64 1 requirements and the matter is contested. 2 MR. LAW: Good morning, Your Honor. 3 Kenneth Law of Bialson, Bergen & Schwab [Ph.] on behalf of Selectron. 4 5 I won't belabor the issue. 6 Our contract is very similar in many respects to the 7 last matter that was before the Court. This is a long-term 8 supply requirements contract and so we're supplying components not only that we make but supplies of products that we put 9 10 together as subcomponents and supply to the debtor for their 11 supply chain. Timing, obviously, is of the essence here. Our 12 13 concern and the risk here is that the risk to my client far 14 exceeds in terms of time the payment and rejection policies 15 under the contract. So in other words, we're required to perform post-petition but we're also required to buy these 16 17 advance future parts in order to supply the requirement side of 18 the contract. It's possible that we may at any given point in 19 time be purchasing or committing to purchase items several 20 million dollars in excess of the actual payment risk that we 21 might have before we know there's a default under this 22 contract. 23 So, therefore, by continuing to perform under this 24 executory contract we're actually extending our risk by several 25 multiple factors.

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65 Now, I understand the argument that was previously 1 made and it applies equally, frankly, to this case. Nonetheless, I think the debtor could make a decision on this within some period of time. I'm not asking for thirty days. I made the offer to the debtor that I would adjourn this hearing 5 if they would make some commitment to make a decision within 6 some time period less than confirmation and they've only been 8 willing to give me a commitment to "some decision will be made before the plan is confirmed." 9 10 Given the risk imposed on my client, I think 11 something less than that in terms of a deadline is appropriate. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I'll not repeat the 14 arguments I made in connection with the last motion but adopt 15 them for purposes of the record for this because it is, I think, similar. 16 17 I would just amplify one issue and that is that --18 this, I believe, also has a termination for convenience 19 provisions in it and there are contractual provisions and what 20 happens in those circumstances with future work that had been 21 authorized -- work in progress that had been authorized -- and 22 those provisions and the risk allocations between the supplier 23 and Delphi had been negotiated between the parties. I don't 24 think that's an assumption or rejection risk particularly

because to the extent that they are acquiring post-petition

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66 inventory or post-petition raw materials for a post-petition basis and they're going to have a claim, whether there's a rejection or not under 503(b) or otherwise, they're going to have administrative claims for what they're doing post-petition and the allocation of risk as between the supplier and the debtors is set forth in those contractual terms which may not be entirely binding but, I think, will provide some guidance to the Court if we ever get there and I just don't think that's a basis to set a time to assume or reject a long-term contract at this point in time in the case. THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to deny this motion as well, again, applying the Burger Boys and Adelphia Communications factors. It's very early in the case. The debtors stated since the start of the case that one of the reasons it is in Chapter 11 is to further rationalize manufacturing facilities and the like and those decisions clearly have not been made yet on how to do that and will take some time to work through and it seems to me that this agreement is bound up in that decision. Secondly, the debtor is, I think, without dispute,

Secondly, the debtor is, I think, without dispute, paying its way post-petition under the contract and, thirdly, as Mr. Butler said, the parties already laid out between themselves the allocation of risk if the contract is terminated for convenience which in essence is what a rejection is and

67 while that is not the absolute measure of a post-petition claim 1 2 it's the clear starting point for one as far as the capital 3 allocation issues go. So I believe that Selectron is reasonably protected 4 5 weighing the balance of all the considerations that I have to 6 keep in mind here. 7 One point that it made and you made today is the 8 financial hardship of not being paid the pre-petition amount owed but, again, that is being borne by in essence all of the 9 10 creditors in this case. If it is so dramatic in Selectron's 11 case that it jeopardizes Selectron's business and the debtor 12 believes that business is necessary ongoing, I've already given 13 the debtor some leeway in connection with the rescue program that I authorized but I don't know whether that's the case here 14 15 or not but it's an additional protection that Selectron has. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 MR. LAW: 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 So, Mr. Butler, with respect to those motions you 19 should, I guess, submit orders denying the motions and if you 20 could just circulate them to the various counsel that were 21 involved. 22 MR. BUTLER: We will, Your Honor. 23 Your Honor, that completes the morning agenda and 24 we'll take up matters 21 and 32 at 2:00. 25 THE COURT: Yes.

68 I'd like to meet briefly with the counsel for the 1 2 committee and for the company just in my conference room back 3 here. Otherwise, we'll resume at 2:00. 4 (Recess.) 5 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 We're back on the record in Delphi. 8 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, we're back on the debtor's 9 second omnibus hearing agenda. 10 If I could revisit matter 20, Your Honor? 11 Matter 20 was something the Court took up this morning and this was the debtor's application for the 12 13 employment of Jones, Lang, LaSalle Americas, Inc. On the record Your Honor noted that we did not 14 15 implicate in the order of Section 330, the Bankruptcy Code, but 16 instead of Section 328. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. BUTLER: That was done, I was advised -- over the 19 hour we did a little research over the lunch hour just to 20 verify where we were at on that -- that was because there are 21 co-brokers in this particular retention arrangement where there 22 can be a sharing of compensation. That would be prohibited 23 under 330 and there's a lot of case law on that point and the 24 way I understand it's been handled in the District before is to 25 prove this under 328. I don't think we're not -- the

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    information is not going to be shared. The retention
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    arrangement will be made available to the U.S. Trustee and the
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    committee but I think because of the nature of that if Your
    Honor is comfortable with a 328 rather than a 330, I just think
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    there's a technical problem.
              THE COURT: Well, what I'm referring to is just the
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    compensation -- the review of their compensation -- of the
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    LaSalle firm's compensation would be under 330.
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              MR. BUTLER: Is the Court comfortable that we made
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    the disclosure about the co-sharing --
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              THE COURT:
                          That's fine. No, that was clear on the
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    application.
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              MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: And they're not just a broker, they're
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    doing other things which is why I think it's kind of a sui
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    generous application.
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              THE COURT: If we could just take a moment for the
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    telephone.
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              (Other parties being included by telephone.)
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              THE COURT:
                          Okav.
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              For those on the phone, we're back on the record in
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    Delphi Corporation.
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              I apologize for the glitch this morning but as I
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    recall, almost all of you were on the phone for the matter that
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    we're going to be addressing this afternoon so I don't think
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70 1 you missed a whole lot. 2 Mr. Butler, why don't you continue. 3 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter we had carried forward from the morning agenda was matter No. 21, the 4 5 Consumers Energy matter and Your Honor had some questions about 6 that. 7 We went back and examined the materials and I can 8 make the following report to the Court. On October 13, 2005, Consumers Power delivered a certified letter to Delphi in which 9 10 Consumers took the position that Delphi could not participate 11 in negotiations for favorable 2006 and beyond preferred rate 12 sets until the special manufacturing contract had been assumed. 13 The position that they were taking was in that 14 interpretation from Consumers Energy was that under their 15 general service transitional primary rate -- TPR -- Delphi was 16 not a current customer under the requirements of that rate set 17 under the availability section which states that the preferable 18 rate will be available to a current customer taking primary 19 voltage service under a special contract on December 31, 2005. 20 The position that the utility has taken is that under their 21 interpretation of the rate sets from Michigan Public Service 22 Commission and that Delphia, because the contract was not 23 assumed, would not be viewed as a current customer for purposes 24 of qualifying under that rate set.

We have, subsequent to receiving that letter, the

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company through Mr. Poole, who is one of the affiants of the Delphi employees available here today to testify, contacted Consumers Energy and took the position that we believed Delphi, because it was making timely post-petition payments under unassumed contract and was entitled to receive service in the ordinary course of business and in light of Your Honor's entry of the 366 order that had taken place, that we believed that we were eligible to participate in that process and asked them to reconsider their position. Consumers reconsidered their position and contacted us again on October 31st and indicated that they had made a determination that Delphi would need to assume the special manufacturing contract before it expired on December 31, 2005 to be subject to the rate set that I described, the general service transitional primary rate -- TPR -- and Consumers recognized in their communications with Delphi that it was entirely within Delphi's discretion whether to assume or reject the contract and recognized there were various uncertainties that were -- including the fact that the Michigan Public Service Commission had not approved the TPR rate -- the final terms of that rate for 2006 and beyond. That was the exchange between the parties. We have

That was the exchange between the parties. We have not done a regulatory review other than to take the position of the utility because of the economics that both the committee and we had reviewed -- it's adjusted economically, this was a very good deal for us, that was the purpose of the motion -- I

72 think if that explanation is not acceptable to Your Honor, I 1 2 think the only thing that we could think of over the lunch 3 recess would be, Your Honor, to include a provision in the assumption order that would direct Consumers Energy to file a 4 certification with this Court essentially certifying to this 5 6 Court that which they have directed -- they have told as a 7 public utility to the debtors -- which is that but for the 8 assumption this preferential rate would not be available. I mean I suppose the other alternative is not to approve the 9 10 motion in which case we run the risk of losing tens of millions 11 of dollars of benefits. 12 THE COURT: Well, the utility has some rights that 13 are unique to it and other utilities under 366 but, actually, 14 as you were going through the facts I was thinking of something 15 else you could put in the order which is already somewhat conditional in that the cure money is not there unless there's 16 17 a satisfactory new contract negotiated. 18 I think you should also put in the order that all 19 issues with respect to violation of the automatic stay are 20 preserved subject to further settlement between the parties. 21 MR. BUTLER: We'll do that, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Because, certainly, under the case law 23 this might fall under that category. But with that caveat, I'll approve the motion. 24 25 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the last and final matter on today's agenda is matter No. 32 which has been referred to as the supplier agreement assumption procedures motion. It's the debtor's motion for an order under various sections of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules to prove (sic) procedures to assume certain amended and restated sole support source supplier agreements filed at docket No. 1098.

Your Honor, there were two, what I would call, substantive objections filed to the motion — to the relief granted under the motion and those were filed by Wilmington Trust Company as indenture trustee and by the official committee of unsecured creditors.

I am pleased to report that we have reached a settlement of those objections with those parties. The balance of the objections, all of which to the extent we were aware of them on the docket, are listed on the agenda as of some point in time yesterday and Exhibits A and B to the debtor's response filed at 4:00 p.m. yesterday afternoon lists all of the objections that we were aware of as of 11:00 yesterday morning, although there have been additional supplier joinders and objections filed since that time.

Your Honor, the debtors filed the assumption procedures motion on Friday, November 18, 2005. I'd like to note at the outset of this hearing and express appreciation to the support that has been given to the debtor's motion by the

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debtor's two largest labor unions, the International Union of United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, otherwise known as the UAW, and the International Union of Electronic Electrical Salaried Machine and Furniture Workers and Communication Workers of America, the IUECWA, as well as the administrative agents for the debtor's pre-petition and post-petition lenders as well as the appearance today of General Motors Corporation's counsel in favor of the motion. That indicates widespread support from some of our more significant customers; our major unions and our lenders and with having now received the support of the committee and the indenture trustee on terms that I will read into the record in a few moments, we believe that most of the substantive objections have been addressed. I think there are a number of issues that suppliers would like to raise with the Court and at a point in this presentation there will be an opportunity for that to occur.

Your Honor, I'd like to note also that the debtors filed as I indicated their omnibus reply to the objections yesterday at docket No. 1299 together with three declarations that were filed in support of the motion. Those include those of John Sheehan, the vice president of corporate restructuring, chief accounting officer and controller for Delphi Corporation; R. David Nelson, the vice president of global supply management for Delphi Corporation and Randall Eisenberg, a senior managing

director of FTI Consulting, Inc.

I'd like to give a little bit of background, Your Honor, and then address the settlement that has been reached with the creditors committee and the indenture trustee.

As Your Honor I think is familiar -- and this goes back to the first day of hearings that we had in this case -- the preservation of the debtor's supply chain is of paramount importance to preserving business enterprise value in these estates. We have a number of very significant restructuring issues to address in these cases. We have to address human capital, we have to address our customers, we have to address our portfolio and product line ends dates as this company is restructured. But through all of that there is a common theme and that is preservation of the supply chain provides business enterprise value to the company because the supply chain and our ability to operate it efficiently is paramount to be able to keeping our customers happy and having them give us new business awards for years out that are four, five, six or seven years out. That's what drives value here.

Ultimately, if you don't maintain the supply chain as Mr. Miller, our chief executive officer said, "If we disappoint our customers by shutting down their plants then they will be desource away from us both in terms of not giving us new business awards and desourcing as they're entitled to -- or at least they would allege they're entitled to -- desourcing away

from us some of our current business and that would have a devastating impact on business enterprise value."

and with the support of many of the other parties in this case, the debtors obtained a significant amount of first day authority from Your Honor to address a series of issues in connection with its supply chain and with its suppliers and we've made several reports to the Court over time regarding the administration of those programs but I can tell the Court today that while only one of the programs was capped and the others were estimated in essence we've used just under half of the authority that people estimated at the time we would need to use and we have provided all the reporting to the committee that Your Honor is aware was to be provided and that process has been, I think and I hope -- Mr. Rosenberg will be able to address this later -- operated to the satisfaction of the committee and the company as we move forward on that.

What we faced in connection with the year-end process is that we had some 11,000 supply contracts that were due to expire on December 31, 2005 absent a further extension and we found a number of our suppliers were prepared to honor their supply commitments under their supply agreements through expiration but not beyond that and that there was not a well-organized process. I mean we believed it was well-organized from our perspective but in terms of the responses we got we

believed that some suppliers at least were seeking to sort of take advantage of the renewal process in a way that we thought was not in the best interests of the company and not in the best interests of its stakeholders and so the debtors, which depending on the foreign currency exchange rates, either the first or second largest global supplier in this industry and whose got literally tens of thousands of these contracts to deal with over the next couple of years, believed that we should try to establish procedures for an orderly way of amending, extending and assuming these agreements. We believed that there were substantial benefits to the estate and the declarations that have been filed describe those in greater detail and I'll try and discuss those in summary form in a few minutes.

Over the course of the last ten days but, certainly, even in discussions dating back with some our stakeholders to early mid-November, around November 11th, we ended up trying to figure out a set of procedures to address these problems that would meet and balance the various needs of the estates in a way that Your Honor ultimately could authorize and in a manner that would allow the company to move forward.

We filed a series of papers with the Court over the last couple of days and those include a black-lined order that was attached as Exhibit C to our responsive brief yesterday and that order as it was described in the responsive brief that we

filed included a series of changes to the relief that we were proposing and I'll not summarize each of these there but they were intended to address many of the issues that had been raised and the objections that were filed and many of the discussions that we have had with the committee and the indenture trustee and other of our major stakeholders.

I'm pleased to report, Your Honor, that that order as is the basis of the settlement that I want to place on the record today with the further modifications that I will now summarize for Your Honor and the indenture trustee that the committee and the company want to -- I'm assuming Your Honor is prepared to approve this order after hearing all the other objections and resolving them -- we would like to be able to review the order overnight and, perhaps, during the day tomorrow and at some point get a revised order to chambers to look at but if Your Honor is willing to go forward in this we're not prepared to submit a draft order today. We hope to do that in the very near future but we want to make sure we get the words correct.

The changes that are contemplated here that resolve the remaining objections of the committee are all centered on two paragraphs of the order, Paragraph 2 of the order and Paragraph 14 of the order. Paragraph 2 of the order is the paragraph that among other things provides that the debtors will permit the creditors committee to monitor the debtor's

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conduct and performance with respect to the order by providing continuing access during regular business hours to the global supply management group at the company's worldwide headquarters by a designated representative of the financial advisor retained by the creditors committee and that also provides how the information that individual gets would be treated.

The committee and the company believe and have agreed to adding language to the paragraph of the order to make it clear that the debtors and the committee are obliged to -- the financial advisors are obliged to work together to establish an information sharing protocol that will be reasonably acceptable to the financial advisor to the creditors committee, that will be subject to the practical limitations of the debtor's global supply management operation and that will provide a relief mechanism that if at any time during the implementation or operation of this order the creditors committee is not satisfied with the information processes or the information that they're receiving, that they can come back to Court, first, through having the debtors and the committee request, Your Honor, to meet with you in a Section 105 chambers status conference as a method of alternative dispute resolution and if that is unsuccessful, then access to the Court for purposes of an emergency hearing to seek modification of the order as appropriate having to do with the issues raised by the committee.

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In connection with the information sharing protocol, the committee and the company have agreed that there should be some threshold for sharing information in terms of the type of information that's shared and as the Court indicated in the November 4th hearing, the threshold that the parties have agreed is a threshold where there would be contracts considered involving a supplier that had \$1 million or more of prepetition liabilities that would be part of a cure arrangement and I don't mean just the contracts that would be examined at that moment but basically we'd draw a line, we know what the pre-petition liabilities are. We'd draw a line at the \$1 million level. Anybody above that who is going to get cure payments against that, those contracts when they're considered would fall into a separate bucket that would be subject to more detailed scrutiny and analysis by the committee. We estimate that that would involve -- I can't tell you the number of contracts -- we estimate that more or less -- and this is not a perfect number, Your Honor -- but more or less that would involve 250 or so of the debtor's suppliers as opposed to having that level of what I'll call scrutiny to the several thousand suppliers that will be involved in this process. In terms of number of suppliers, in terms THE COURT: of the pre-petition trade debt, what percentage do you have roughly would that be? Is it the majority of it? MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I haven't looked at the

81 October pre-petition trade debt. The amount of trade debt that 1 2 is subject to these contracts is in the range -- we actually 3 have an exhibit on it which I'll get into a little bit later -the gross level is about \$1 billion but that number comes way 4 down when you look at what we think would be implicated in this 5 6 program which is less than, I think, about half of that but 7 we've got an exhibit to introduce into evidence and get some estimates on that number, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: But of that \$580 million or so, how much 10 -- do you know what these 250 or so suppliers meet? Would it 11 be half of the \$587 million? 12 MR. BUTLER: Generally, I think, Your Honor, the 13 estimate is about sixty percent. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. BUTLER: Of the total trade debt would be 16 implicated in the suppliers with more than \$1 million of pre-17 petition exposure. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, with suppliers that have 20 less than \$1 million of aggregate exposure the protocol would 21 still address the less detailed information that they required 22 with respect to that. 23 In addition, Your Honor, we have agreed, there is a 24 part of our procedures in dealing with any of these 25 transactions is there is a global supply management approval

panel that deals with significant transactions to the company and that panel or review committee -- we've committed to the creditors committee that that panel would review each of the contracts that would be assumed for anyone in the million dollar and above threshold -- they meet above that threshold -- and we've also agreed that the senior member of Messerow that is going to e responsible for this process on behalf of the committee could participate -- and I'll say attend because they're not making the decisions and the committee wants to make it clear that they're not making the decisions -- but they could attend and certainly be heard at those review panel meetings so that they would have the actual opportunity and then report back to the committee exactly how the process is working because they'll be sitting in on it on those major contract assumptions.

In order to provide that level of access to the committee's financial advisors, the committee has committed to the debtors that there will be a designated senior Messerow executive who will be responsible for this process and at least for the period dealing with the assumption of the December contracts that that individual will devote the necessary time - and we think it's probably substantially their full-time at the company -- and they will have such other assistance as Messerow needs to have and they've told us they'll need a few other Messerow folks out there to help them but what's

83 important to the company is that there be continuity of the 1 2 Messerow team that's there and that the senior individual 3 responsible be constant to the company so that they can have a meaningful opportunity to be involved with the global supply 4 5 management team. 6 That's the understanding with respect to Paragraph 2 7 of the order, Your Honor, in terms of the information sharing 8 protocol and how that would operate. 9 THE COURT: Could I interrupt you just for a second? 10 Is it still the intention that this be professionals 11 eyes only, <u>i.e.</u>, Messerow and the counsel for the committee 12 with sort of generic summaries? 13 MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. Absolutely. 14 THE COURT: Okav. 15 MR. ROSENBERG: If I may clarify, Your Honor? 16 That is correct with respect to what we are calling 17 the conforming contracts. That is the conforming settlements. 18 MR. BUTLER: Yes, I believe with respect to the non-19 conforming settlements we're not going to let individual 20 committee members gain access to pricing information as it relates to any suppliers. 21 22 MR. ROSENBERG: What we are going to have to do there 23 is come up with an appropriate mechanism pursuant to which if 24 Messerow wishes to recommend an objection to the committee and 25 -- Mr. Butler hasn't reached that point in his description yet

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84 -- that an appropriate level of information can get to the committee without disclosing names or anything else that is identifying or essential but there's got to be an appropriate level of disclosure there so that the committee can react appropriately. THE COURT: Okav. MR. ROSENBERG: It would not be unlike, I believe, the information that is presently supplied under the existing programs by Messerow. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: I have no worries that we can work through that mechanic, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: The other change, Your Honor, is to Paragraph 14 of the order. Paragraph 14 of the order provides the ability for the filing of a supplemental objection under two conditions here; first, at any time on or after March 1, 2006 -- and the purpose of that particular provision, Your Honor, has been that the debtors believe and I think the committee now concurs that once the company runs this process through the December batch of renewals we'll have a pretty good population to be able to understand how the program is working and it gives the committee the opportunity at any time after March 1, 2006 to file an objection about the future prospective application of the program. So that's not tied to any use,

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it's just that it's an unlimited opportunity to object on and after that date.

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There's also an opportunity to object if the amounts of cure contractually committed to be paid by the debtors pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the order exceed a dollar amount.

Now, it currently says \$150 million. I'll address that in a moment.

Exclusive of cure amounts associated with nonconforming assumptions. There are two changes to that part of the order. First, the number amount would move from \$150 million down to \$100 million and, second, the ways in which the exclusion is calculated would be limited to cure amounts associated with non-conforming assumptions to which the committee does not object. Put another way, Your Honor, if the committee under this mechanism -- if there's a non-conforming assumption that comes to the committee's attention and they don't like it, they object to it, they come to court, Your Honor says, "Hey, debtors, I've decided you win that won, you can assume it, " then that dollar amount -- the cure associated with that dollar amount of the Court-approved assumptions counts in against the \$100 million to reduce the \$100 million and then, remember, that, Your Honor, is simply a threshold. The whole point of that measurement -- and Your Honor has said in other hearings about the importance of having the committee be able to monitor things -- that's the level where the

debtor's entirely comfortable with it, we've agreed to it, that's the level in which the committee's currently comfortable

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3 as we move into this program on the threshold.

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Now, all the threshold does is say that either they or the pre-petition agent can file an objection. Now, there's a change to the next sentence and, again, I'm not trying to give specific words -- just the understanding that we'll draft the words later -- but in the event the party filing a supplemental objection seeks an emergency hearing, that sentence is going to change. First, it will change in the following respects. In the event the party decides to file a supplemental objection they will be required to give advance notice to the debtors and to enter into a meet and confer process that will take at least two business days so that we have an opportunity to try to work it out and after that, that sort of alternative dispute resolution mechanism occurs. If it can't be worked out then a supplemental objection can be filed. Under the mechanism I'm now going to describe, Your Honor, once it's filed the Court would schedule that for a hearing as soon as reasonably practicable for the Court. So we'd get a hearing in front of Your Honor as soon as the Court's calendar would permit and Your Honor would be prepared to hear it as opposed to the mechanism that otherwise was in the order and the other piece of this is from and after the time -- the way this mechanism works, the last sentence of Paragraph 14 says, "The

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    debtor shall continue to be authorized to assume supply
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    agreements pursuant to the terms of this order following the
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    filing of the supplemental objection until the Court disposes
    of the supplemental objection after notice and a hearing.
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   would be modified in two respects; (1) we would be authorized
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    to do it but it would pick up the meet and confer period as
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   well as the supplemental objection and it would limit the
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    additional assumptions without Court authority to cures in the
    aggregate of $25 million.
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              MR. ROSENBERG: My partner, Mr. Savage [Ph.], just
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    wanted to clarify that the restriction on spending limited to
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    $25 million commences upon the notice to the debtor of our
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    objection and the request to meet and greet.
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              MR. BUTLER: Correct.
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              MR. ROSENBERG:
                              Okay.
              MR. BUTLER: I think I said -- is that in the meet
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    and confer period? That's correct.
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              MR. ROSENBERG:
                              Okav.
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              Excuse me. Meet and confer. I'm always happy to
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    greet.
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              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, just to also be clear here
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    is in the event there's an emergency hearing, the burden of
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    proof before continuing the program would rest on the debtors.
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              Could I have a moment, Your Honor?
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              THE COURT:
                          Yes.
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88 (Pause in proceedings.) 1 2 MR. BUTLER: Mr. Rosenberg wasn't part of our 3 discussions this morning but I think we can move (sic) our agreement along. 4 5 In connection where there's an objection with a nonconforming agreement, the burden of proof to demonstrate to 6 7 Your Honor why we should be able to assume that is the debtor's 8 as well. 9 Your Honor, I believe that I have captured the 10 changes to Paragraphs 2 and 14 of the order that would cause 11 the committee and the indenture trustee to consider their 12 objections resolved. 13 THE COURT: Before I hear from them, is the amount of 14 potential preference waivers taken into account in these caps? 15 MR. BUTLER: No, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. ROSENBERG: In connection with the contracts in 18 question, otherwise, it's a non-conforming agreement that 19 requires the committee consent. 20 MR. BUTLER: Correct. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 As to the point about the contracts in question, I 23 had a question about that definition which is in Paragraph 2. 24 It's in 2(b). It says that "these contracts don't include (b) 25 or any agreements that are not related to the continuation of

the supply chain" and then it has a parenthetical, "except with respect to agreements related to the debtor's obligations to provide manufactured goods on account of direct and indirect government contracts" and my question is that an exception to - what is that an exception to? Is that an exception to the supply chain? I mean it's something on top of the supply chain or does it say that even with the supply chain these aren't included in there?

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, what we tried to do here was to limit the scope of the program so we did it in two ways; the first one Your Honor didn't question, it's pretty clear, if someone sold their claim we're not going to assume that contract for this program at least.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUTLER: Then the second one is we agreed to say that we're not going to assume agreements that aren't related to the automotive manufacturing facility locations because we have other facilities that don't have quite the same supply chain issues with them or we'll address them in a separate motion but the government contract thing is the exception to the exception because the problem is with government contracts, the way in which the government contracts are written, whether they're direct to us or they're indirect to the supply chain to us is if you don't get the goods in to supply the government, what the government's contracts say is you have to shut down

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    the plant and not supply anybody else.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              So it's an exception to the exception?
              MR. BUTLER: Correct.
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              THE COURT:
                          All right.
              MR. BUTLER: The reason for it is because the
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    government has this special provision that basically says if
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   you can't service us, you can't service anybody else.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              Then Paragraph 15 was put in, I assume, was put in in
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    response to the objections; the one dealing with the KEYSIP
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    (sic)?
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              MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          But it was a little opaque to me.
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    the intent of this paragraph? Is it just to say that these
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   payments don't add on to someone's right to a KEYSIP?
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              MR. BUTLER: No.
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              One of the things that was suggested is that our
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    proposed KEYSIP program is up through January 5th has an annual
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    incentive program. That annual incentive program has as its
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    proposed target measurement, EBITDAR, which is not the normal
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    EBITDA target, but like most restructurings has an "R" at the
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    end of the EBITDA calculation which means you exclude
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    restructuring charges from the measurement and there was at
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    least the implication in one of the objections that somehow or
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other we would try to classify as restructuring expenses the otherwise gap expenses that would normally go above the line, in a particular monthly period we put them below the line and, therefore, not subject the incentive compensation measurements to those amounts and our view of that, Your Honor, was that was never the intention and we thought the easiest way — nobody solicited this language from us, the debtors put this in unilaterally. We want to make it very clear, you know, we know this is not a KEYSIP here and we'll have another day for that that we want to do it.

Now, what we did not do is address in this order are balance sheet issues. To the extent that you pay down a prepetition liability, that's a balance sheet adjustment, that's not a -- that EBITDA would never effect that issue. That's simply a balance sheet issue in terms of obligations subject to compromise and so we made no adjustment for that.

But to the suggestion that we would take anything in this program and charge it to "R" for the restructuring and, therefore, exempt it from the capturing within what would be comprehended in the KEYSIP program as a measurement target, we simply wanted the Court to be aware that wasn't the intention and that's what we put it there for.

THE COURT: Okay.

So no one's potential bonus or compensation is going to be structured so that they're incentivized to pay down pre-

92 1 petition debt? 2 MR. BUTLER: Correct. 3 THE COURT: Okav. Why don't I hear from the committee and Wilmington 4 5 Trust then on this. MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, the committee basically, 6 7 when you boil down our objection to the original motion was 8 concerned with two points; one was that the program have appropriate caps attached to it or if you will at least targets 9 10 which the committee had an input into as to whether or not they 11 went beyond and that the program was properly monitored with 12 respect to a level of information and participation by the 13 creditors committee consistent with the extraordinary relief of 14 paying down a large amount of pre-petition debt. The committee 15 never for a moment questioned the debtor's legitimate concern that the prospect of all of these expiring contracts at the end 16 17 of the year could create supply chain issues which were not in 18 anybody's interest whatsoever, the committee did have serious 19 problems with the debtor's initial proposal for how to solve 20 it, principally again, for the two reasons suggested that it 21 didn't seem properly targeted to those with the most clout to 22 actually cause a problem and, instead, created a situation 23 where those with the lease amount of clout to cause a problem 24 were essentially being handed a gift but still left the problem 25 of those with substantial clout and what we have now negotiated

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93 is an arrangement pursuant to which the committee has sufficient oversight and input into the process to be comfortable that the money is going where it should be going to prevent interruptions to the supply chain and not simply be spent kind of in an off-handed, throw it up in the air and see where it sticks sort of way. Accordingly, the committee is satisfied that we now have an appropriate communal solution to a legitimate problem or at least an appropriate communal approach to a solution to what is clearly a legitimate problem and, accordingly, with the changes that have been read into the record the committee is satisfied that the program as amended should go forward for the period as described. I don't want to say on a trial basis because we're quite convinced that the debtor will exercise its rights and use our money appropriately but it does gives us the appropriate mechanism for coming to Court with the burden remaining on the debtor to justify what it is doing and the continuation of the program and on that basis the oversight of both the committee and the Court is properly placed and we are satisfied with the proposal as it was now described to the Court. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fox. MR. FOX: Thank you, Your Honor.

Edward Fox from Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Nickels &

94 Grimm, LLP on behalf of Wilmington Trust Company as indenture 1 2 trustee. 3 Your Honor, before I address the compromise I do have to ask Mr. Butler a question which is the language that was 4 5 added to Paragraph 12 of the order goes beyond preference waivers if I understand it. I don't know why that was added or 6 7 why that is the case? 8 MR. BUTLER: The language that was adopted in 9 Paragraph 12 -- I think you're talking about the first 10 sentence? 11 MR. FOX: Yes. MR. BUTLER: The first sentence that was added was to 12 13 make it very clear that with respect to an assumed contract and 14 with respect to amounts paid under that assumed contract, there 15 were no avoidance powers of the debtors that would be used in connection with that. So once you've assumed a contract you 16 17 wouldn't have a fraudulent transfer of any other kind and uses 18 the avoidance powers of Chapter 5. That's all. 19 MR. FOX: Well, except that the motion as I 20 understood it only asked for preference waivers under 547. 21 MR. BUTLER: It's a different issue. 22 We asked for 547 preference waivers for other 23 contracts the supplier might have as the opportunity to use 24 this on a negotiating basis. I'm going to tell the score of 25 suppliers' counselors sitting in the courtroom that we don't

intend to pass those out either on a willy nilly basis -- to use Mr. Rosenberg's words. But they were intended to say that we recognize when you work with a supplier some suppliers are going to want to negotiate preference waivers as to things not being assumed.

We believe the law is generally -- and we put it in for purposes of clarity because suppliers want to understand this -- that as to a contract that's assumed the payments under that contract are in fact protected from Chapter 5, not just preferences -- once you've assumed the contract as a postpetition obligation it's not a fraudulent transfer, the avoidance actions are in fact taken care of which is why we added Chapter 5 as opposed to -- but that Chapter 5, that first sentence, Mr. Fox, is limited only to the payments made to covered supplier with respect to the assumable contracts actually assumed. It's a much more limited statement but it's intended to be clear to that matter.

MR. ROSENBERG: So if I may, just to make sure we have a clear record here, to the extent that a supplier asks in addition for any kind of Chapter 5 type waiver with respect to anything else other than the contract being assumed, that is a non-conforming agreement that specifically requires the consent of the committee.

MR. BUTLER: That's correct.

Or the review and objection process of the committee.

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.

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MR. FOX: Subject to seeing the actual form of order, Wilmington Trust is prepared to go along with the compromises being put on the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, we do want to make an evidentiary record here. We don't expect to present live testimony at this point and we do recognize that there have been a group of very patient counsel representing a lot of suppliers on the phone and in the room today that have presented -- and we've had conversations with most if not all of them to deal with several issues and I should say, Your Honor, under the case management as Your Honor knows there is a meet and confer obligation with respect to contested matters and many if not most of the counsel in this case for this contested matter cooperated and participated in meet and confers. The committee and Wilmington Trust and the company had many meet and confers. With respect to the suppliers we had some smaller meet and confers and at least one large organized or two large organized meet and confers and that has led to a change in Paragraph 10 which I want to discuss specifically and then some clarifying language throughout the order that was in the order before, I'm not going to read it through in detail, but it has to do with how a supplier can be found to be under the terms of this order.

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When the debtors filed this motion we were seeking to use the customary arrangements in the automotive industry which provides essentially that people either sign documents or they perform under agreements. It is not uncommon in the industry for people to receive purchase orders, ship under those purchase orders without giving a written acknowledgment or without signing a contract and then be paid and that's viewed not only in the Uniform Commercial Code, generally, as it's adopted in most states, but by custom, acceptance by performance. We include that as an option under this order and doing so caused a wrath of objections to be filed by a score of suppliers and, you know, again, we found it in some respects peculiar -- not trying to characterize the objections -- but we believe that this order is a significant benefit for a number of suppliers. Obviously, there are suppliers who don't want to be covered by this or certainly they don't want to be covered by it by performance and so we have categorically eliminated that as an option.

The only way now that any supplier can be impacted by this order in any way as it relates to their contractual relationships with Delphi is in the event the covered supplier actually executes and delivers to the debtors an assumption agreement that comes to the debtors and at one point even in Paragraph 10, Your Honor, and I would say it's an assumption agreement or an agreement authorized under and subject to

Paragraph 6 of the order taking into account what Paragraph 6 permits as well, but it's not a similar document. We put in a similar document to let people acknowledge in various forms and enough suppliers convinced us that they didn't want that and so we took it out and so it's now assumption agreement or an agreement authorized under and subject to Paragraph 6 of the order.

Therefore, there is in the debtor's view, absent the signature and execution of an assumption agreement, there is no opportunity for a supplier to be in any way bound by the terms of this order and, therefore, because of that change we have in Paragraph B of the order asked Your Honor to overrule all of the objections of suppliers filed in opposition to the motion to the extent they're not deemed otherwise settled or withdrawn.

I would note, Your Honor, that there are counsel here who will make the argument -- either one or fifty of them -- that suppliers request or that the counsel request that notice of any proposed assumption be directed to specific individuals, either outside counsel or to other specific individuals and the debtors are resistant to that and at the appropriate time after the argument is made we'll explain to you why that is. This is a process done through supply management change throughout the industry and a new individual supplier has got to regulate itself. They can decide whether they're going to sign an

agreement under their internal procedures. We're not going to try to complicate and we'll argue vigorously to Your Honor to ask you not to require us to set up a process which is different than the customary supply process in the industry. If a supplier signs the contract, then they sign the contract but we want to do business with the people who are customarily responsible for this.

I also want to bring to the Court's attention as it relates to suppliers an issue that has come up which we are going to try to consult with the committee and seek some resolution of and, perhaps, even with the U.S. Trustee.

There are a number of 2019 statements that have been filed and others that are contemplated to be filed for an individual lawyer or firm to represent multiple suppliers in this case and the issues that we're talking about here all relate to pricing and individual economic terms and competitive information, all of which is highly confidential, represents trade secrets of the company and, you know, one of the things you never do in the supply management business is show how one supplier structures their deal to another supplier or invite the suppliers to all congregate together and figure out the best way to place their products to the company. In fact, there are federal laws starting with the anti-trust statutes, among others, that prohibit that and provide both criminal and civil sanctions.

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you want to proceed.

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In addition, confidentiality is paramount in connection with this and we have met with and conferred with some of the counsel who filed those statements and asked them to work with us promptly to try to sort through that because the debtors are not making any claims on this record but the debtors are very concerned about how somebody can -- a single lawyer can represent fourteen or fifteen or seventeen suppliers with respect to providing advice on how pricing and negotiations ought to be going vis-a-vis Delphi and look at -the same person look at seventeen different suppliers economic I don't know how one does that without violating -packages. without that supplier violating confidentiality obligations they have at Delphi and without the anti-trust statutes and other laws being implicated. So it's a real concern for the We raise it on the record only to make note of the We hope to work it out with people. If we can't, concern. Your Honor, the debtors will likely file some type of application or motion with the Court to address that and make sure that an appropriate protective order is entered to protect the debtor's interests. Now, Your Honor, what remains in this hearing is the following. We need to present some matters into evidence and then hear from the suppliers and I want to ask Your Honor how

THE COURT: Well, I'm happy to take a proffer on the

evidence. My main question, which I hope the proffer will address, is why this concern hasn't arisen in the four or five years before Delphi filed bankruptcy and in the years before then when it wasn't Delphi but Delco since I gather at least over the last few years with the move to real time supply suppliers could have this type of leverage even aside of the bankruptcy context where their contracts are not longer than a year or two and they could easily hold up Delphi at the time those contracts expire.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: But other than that I mean that's my main question, but if you're prepared to give a proffer I'll take a proffer.

MR. BUTLER: Let me introduce the evidence with respect that we have with respect to that and then if I can briefly confer -- I may actually call someone to answer that question directly to make sure Your Honor has the answer rather than me try and state the proffer in a way I want to actually call someone in that but let me try to get the evidence on the record.

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, before Mr. Butler begins
I just want to state on the record that obviously considering
that we have compromised as described on the record we don't
have any particular interest in objecting to or cross-examining
with respect to the proffer, but as Your Honor heard there will

be any number of situations where we'll come back to Court and the burden of proof remains on the debtor notwithstanding that we may initiate the next court appearance and accordingly I'd like it clear that by not objecting to anything proffered today or cross-examining we are not waiving any rights whatsoever with respect to any such future hearings.

THE COURT: As far the Committee and Wilmington Trust are concerned, I'm reviewing this under the TMT lowest bounds of reasonableness standard.

MR. ROSENBERG: Very good, Your Honor. Thank you.

(Exhibit Book, Debtor's Exhibit A, Marked.)

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, we prepared an exhibit book that I'd like to mark Debtor's Exhibit A which has in it essentially sixteen exhibits. The first is the declaration of Randall Eisenberg that was filed at Docket Number 1278. The second is the declaration of David Nelson filed at Docket 1279. The third is the declaration of John Sheehan, Docket Number 1280, fourth is Exhibit A to the debtor's omnibus response, fifth is Exhibit B to that response. Sixth is the Exhibit C. That was the proposed assumptions order as it was filed with the motion. Seven is the current blacklined order. Exhibit 8 is an analysis the debtor's did of AP contract assumptions. Nine is the expiring contracts divisional data. Eleven, and there are a series of six demonstrative exhibits. Eleven is assumption procedures approval process. Twelve is the minimum

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Eisenberg - Direct
                                                                 103
    required provisions. Thirteen is accumulative cash flow
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 2
    benefit estimated by the debtors through the first quarter of
 3
    2007. Fourteen is the expiring direct material contracts.
    Fifteen is unresolved direct material contracts, and sixteen is
 4
 5
    the estimated pre-petition exposure for assumable agreements.
 6
              Exhibit 10 had been some exemplary supply responses
7
    which we've eliminated and substituted in their place a
 8
    supplemental proffer of Mr. Eisenberg.
9
              THE COURT: Okay.
10
              MR. BUTLER: I'd like to move those into evidence,
11
    Your Honor, if I may.
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              THE COURT: Do you have a copy of them?
13
              MR. BUTLER: I do if I may present them.
14
              THE COURT: Yes. Any objection to their admission
15
    for the purposes of this hearing?
              Hearing none, I'll admit them.
16
17
             (Exhibit Book, Debtor's Exhibit A, Received.)
18
              MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              Could I have a moment, Your Honor?
20
              THE COURT: Yes.
21
                        [Pause in proceedings.]
22
              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, with the Court's permission
23
    we would just call Mr. Eisenberg to the stand and let him
24
    answer any questions Your Honor has on this. I think that he's
25
    prepared to answer the question that you posed on the record
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Eisenberg - Direct
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    and any other questions the Court might have.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. BUTLER: Mr. Eisenberg.
              THE COURT: Mr. Eisenberg, would you raise your right
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 5
    hand, please.
             (Randall Eisenberg, Debtor's Witness, Sworn.)
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 7
              THE COURT: Why don't you elicit the information
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    needed for the record as to Mr. Eisenberg's qualifications.
9
                           DIRECT EXAMINATION
    BY MR. BUTLER:
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         Mr. Eisenberg, were you present in court during the course
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    of this hearing on the assumption procedures motion?
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    Α
         Yes, I have been.
         The Court asked and wanted evidence in the record
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    regarding why this issue with contracts has come -- the renewal
    contract renewal issues, why the debtors are experiencing
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    difficulties not that were not experienced last year or three
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    or four years ago or after the spinoff from GM or at some other
19
    time? Do you have a view as to that question?
20
         Yes, I do.
    Α
21
         Could you explain to the Court, please?
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         Let me address the answer in two components, first from
23
    looking at it from an industry perspective and then second
24
    looking at it specifically from the debtor's issues.
25
         As it relates to the industry one of the significant
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Eisenberg - Direct

factors that have changed over the last couple of years is that the industry, the automotive supplier industry is under significant strain, far more than in prior years as a result of a number of other suppliers who have filed for Chapter 11. The knowledge that the OEMs, the original equipment manufacturers are losing market share, that the OEMs are also putting significant pressures on their suppliers to boost their own financial profitability, and as a result of these and the various Chapter 11 filings that have occurred suppliers are under a greater greater strain right now to manage through these difficult times.

I think second, from an industry's perspective the suppliers in general are a lot more sophisticated than -- or are sophisticated relative to suppliers in other industries and therefore have a good understanding themselves and with counsel of where they have specific leverage with their customers.

As it specifically relates to the debtors, a couple of observations. First, the debtors have filed for Chapter 11 and as a result suppliers have an amount of pre-petition obligations that they were not paid which has burdened them even further. Second, I think it has been publicly reported that the debtors are going through a very significant restructuring. That restructuring will impact or result in a significant cost reduction and that cost reduction may include the consolidation sale or closure of plants. This creates a

Eisenberg - Direct

significant amount of anxiety among the suppliers. It causes suppliers to look short term at what their leverage points are and their leverage points tend to be in the areas of first, seeing if there's a way for their pre-petition obligations to be paid during their contract period and we have some motions that enable us in certain situations to do that.

Alternatively, when their contracts expire they recognize this as a valuable leverage point for them and many suppliers we use our leverage point to either increase prices, insist on pre-petition amounts cured or put other -- ask for other things that will enable them to get as much as they can from their leverage point.

Those are the primary factors I think changed today relative to a couple of years ago and also deals specifically with the debtor's situation.

One last point with -- if I could, Your Honor, is that the debtors, unlike many of the other companies that have filed in this industry, it's a \$28 billion revenue business globally. It has a significant impact relative to the other suppliers in the entire automotive industry and with that significant impact and -- it has caused a number of suppliers to suffer greater than as a result of other Chapter 11 filings.

THE COURT: Am I right though that given the nature of the industry the suppliers also don't have that many other customers to go to?

## Eisenberg - Direct

THE WITNESS: It really depends upon the supplier, Your Honor. I think there are two factors to consider in that regard. One, suppliers — this debtor may be a large customer and may in fact be a relatively small customer to many of our suppliers. Number two, many of our suppliers recognize that they cannot continue to operate if they're losing money. We know we have some suppliers who even said the amount that they lost in their pre-petition claim equates to a significant amount of profitability for the last couple of years. That's how tight the margins are.

So as a result many of the suppliers wonder whether they should remain in this business at all absent being able to create a financially sound platform to do that in.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me ask you first. Who is going to make the decisions at the debtor or the debtor entities about how to respond to supplier requests for new contracts or offering new contracts to the suppliers? Who's in charge of that and how does the chain of command go?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Mr. Butler, I believe we have an exhibit. If it's all right with you, Your Honor, I'd like to take you through that exhibit. I think it can address your question most effectively.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Can I approach the witness, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

Eisenberg - Direct 108 1 [Pause in proceedings.] 2 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I believe Mr. Eisenberg is 3 speaking to Exhibit Number 11, Debtor's Exhibit 11. THE WITNESS: First, the global supply management 4 5 group which is the supply management group within Delphi will 6 have overall responsibility for managing the process. 7 this diagram illustrates is a tiering process which starts at 8 the lowest level which are the buyers themselves and there's -as this exhibit indicates, over 600 buyers, buyers who've been 9 10 assigned responsibility for different suppliers and they are 11 the ones that are in direct contact with those buyers on a 12 regular basis -- I'm sorry. Those suppliers rather on a regular basis and understand the debtor's leverage points with 13 14 those suppliers as well as the suppliers leverage points with 15 the debtors. 16 The global supply management has established a set of 17 criteria by which they will direct the buyers, their 18 negotiating parameters with each of the suppliers. To the 19 extent these buyers are able to sufficiently or adequately 20 negotiate within the parameters that are established then they 21 will have the authority to enter into those agreements on 22 behalf of the debtors with the suppliers. 23 THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry now. When you say within 24 the parameters established, amplify on that.

THE WITNESS: Absolutely.

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Eisenberg - Direct

THE COURT: They're not going to automatically offer people 75 percent cure, are they?

THE WITNESS: The structure, Your Honor, that we are contemplating and it's still being finalized, but the structure we're contemplating this to bifurcate the suppliers into two categories, those with pre-petition dollars in excess of \$1 million and those with pre-petition dollars or exposure less than \$1 million.

For those that have less than \$1 million, the buyers would have the authority to execute into contracts whereby the supplier has agreed on all of the terms that are outlined in the motion and as it relates to the cure amounts to some percentage and the percentage we're contemplating is up to 60 percent. That doesn't mean that the buyer will automatically offer 60 percent. The thought process here is the buyer understands a leverage point will offer what they believe is an appropriate amount and will have the ability to negotiate real time to attempt to come to an agreement but cannot exceed 60 percent.

For those suppliers -- let me if I could just finish the other side of that coin, which is those suppliers that are in excess with pre-petition balances in excess of \$1 million, all of those situations will need to be approved in a much senior level in the chain and that's specifically at the assumption procedures approval panel that's in this box in the

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Eisenberg - Direct
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   middle of the page.
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              So we've intentionally bifurcated --
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              THE COURT:
                          That's the panel that Messerow can sit in
    on?
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              THE WITNESS: Correct, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okav.
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              THE WITNESS:
                            Through this process to the extent
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    there are difficulties in getting a supplier to agree to what
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    specifically the company believes is appropriate regardless of
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    what the percentage but not in excess of 60 percent as I
11
    indicated, that will escalate through this pyramid that I have
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    here in this slide all the way up to the panel and ultimately
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    the panel will make authorization for number one, any
    deviations from the standard terms and conditions that we've
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15
    outlined in the motion; two, for any cure amounts that either
    the debtor believes is unreasonable but not to exceed 60
16
17
    percent, and then as it relates to the contracts in excess of
18
    $1 million all parameters that are being proposed.
19
              THE COURT: Will the buyers have information
20
    available to them showing transfers made to the supplier within
21
    ninety days or the filing date that might be preferences so
22
    that they could have that as part of their negotiating
23
    leverage? Has that -- would that analysis be available to
24
    them?
25
              THE WITNESS: To the extent the analysis is
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Eisenberg - Direct
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1
    available, yes. The preference --
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry, to the extent --
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              THE WITNESS: To the extent the analysis is
    available, yes. The preference analysis has not been fully
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    completed obviously because of the timing in this case, but --
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              THE COURT: But this would just be -- I mean these
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    are suppliers that they ostensibly deal with a lot. So I would
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    think that they would at least have a list of the payments made
    to them within ninety days of the filing date.
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10
              THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I believe that they will
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    understand which suppliers may have a preference and may have
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    some assessment as to a quantification to it or a financial
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    impact. I just don't want to mislead the Court to say that it
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    will be fully analyzed unless on a specific vendor basis it's
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    absolutely necessary.
              THE COURT:
16
                          Okay.
    BY MR. BUTLER:
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         Mr. Eisenberg, I also wonder if you might -- just a couple
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    of questions on leverage issues between the suppliers of this
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    company and the company.
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         In your -- to the best of your knowledge, do we -- does
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    this company obtain simply raw materials or more specialized
23
    components from its suppliers?
24
         A significant portion of the product purchase is highly
25
    customized in specialized parts which take a significant amount
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112 of time to research and obtain -- engineer and research and 1 2 obtain customer approval to produce. 3 Do you have an opinion as to whether that is the type of product that Delphi obtains from its suppliers has any impact 4 on the leverage of those suppliers negotiating with Delphi? 5 I believe it does. 6 Α 7 What's your opinion? For the record, I asked if you had 8 an opinion. You said I believe --9 Excuse me. I do have an opinion and yes, I do believe Α 10 they have leverage. The suppliers have leverage on Delphi. 11 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, are there any other areas of examination that the Court would like to hear outside of --12 13 THE COURT: Actually, I have a question for you and 14 Mr. Rosenberg which is the -- I don't know how many there are, 15 but the suppliers who have already entered into extension agreements, are they non conforming or conforming at this 16 17 point, i.e. if they are offered new agreements along these 18 terms are they -- I'm a little confused about where they fall 19 out in this. MR. BUTLER: If they fall within -- if they agree to 20 21 amend their previous agreements to adopt all of these new terms 22 along the lines of the motion they could be conforming. If 23 they refuse to they could be non conforming. 24 THE COURT: And it's up to the debtors to decide in 25 the first instance with the Committee oversight whether they

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want to want to offer that to the -- offer the new terms to the extension agreement parties?

MR. BUTLER: Correct. Your Honor, if you look at Exhibit 14 you'll see that there is some direct material There's a pie shape that describes the total contracts. universe of contracts and gives you at least the debtor's preliminary cut on those that need to be assumed through a negotiation and extension and those that don't require an extension. I mean it is not -- the company doesn't believe that everyone is entitled to this or should get it. Obviously one of the very peculiar positions of being in the fish bowl of a Delphi Chapter 11 is I get to sit in a federal courtroom with a Federal Judge and explain global supply management strategy with sixty suppliers' counsel sitting in the back taking copious notes about exactly how we're trying to manage this and that puts the debtors at some disadvantage but we understand it's a necessary part of this process but we are trying to keep this at a summary level because we would like to be able to have some strategic leverage with them.

But as this particular exhibit illustrates as we've reviewed with the Committee, not every supplier is entitled to or should receive the benefits of this order and this gives you some sense of the preliminary cut of how one might approach it.

THE COURT: Indeed more than half, arguably more than more than half.

114 MR. BUTLER: These are the total contracts, not just 1 2 the renewals, Your Honor. To give you a sense of --3 THE COURT: I'm sorry. But the people who have already entered into extensions, is that the 44? 4 5 MR. BUTLER: No, those are the people who refused to. 6 It's the 568. 7 THE COURT: 568 have already --8 MR. BUTLER: Exhibit 15 gives you a sense, this gives you a sense of the issues we're dealing with, Your Honor. 9 10 We've actually sent out requests -- we had a November 15th 11 deadline for all of our suppliers to renew their 2006 12 agreements. That's a normal rollover process that occurs every 13 year. Exhibit 16 gives you a sense of how many people actually 14 responded to that request. 15 I'm not trying to publish all these numbers for the 16 Financial Times, but the reality is obviously a small subset 17 have actually -- the Wall Street Journal -- a small subset have 18 actually responded at this point in time, and the debtors 19 believe and Mr. Eisenberg testified that has to do a lot to the 20 uncertainties in these cases which is the part of the unique 21 issues that we're dealing with here. 22 THE COURT: Okay. So with respect to those who have 23 already agreed -- whoever is on the phone, please put it on 24 mute. Whoever has already agreed to an extension they're going 25 to apply the same business logic to whether to grant them

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   better terms that they already agreed to?
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              MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. To the extent they
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    request them and the debtors believe that it would be in their
    best interest because of the additional benefits that are
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    contemplated in the motion that the debtors will receive as a
    result of assuming their contract.
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 7
              THE COURT:
                          That being some more flexibility and some
 8
   more comfort on the supplier end, those are the two benefits?
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              MR. BUTLER: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear you. Could
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   you repeat that?
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              THE COURT: There's two benefits being a) more
    flexibility for the debtor, and b) some additional good will on
12
13
    the supplier side.
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              MR. BUTLER: In addition to that, requiring two-year
15
    terms which was --
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              THE COURT: That's the flexibility.
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              MR. BUTLER: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.
18
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
19
              MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, with the admission of the
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    declarations and the proffers and with Mr. Eisenberg's direct
21
    testimony and the admission of the other exhibits, that would
22
    represent the debtor's evidentiary record and I would move Your
23
    Honor to close the record.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I also wanted to mention in
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connection with the order today during one of the court recesses the debtors agreed to make one other change to Paragraph 6. Again, by way of clarification and just -- I was told that if I read into this record as many as fifteen or sixteen lawyers might not come to the podium. So I figured it was worth it. And that is the first part of the sentence would read as follows: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein but subject to Paragraph 10 hereof, should a covered supplier and the debtors execute an agreement that deviates from any required minimum provision, and then the paragraph would continue.

They again simply wanted to clarify that it requires the execution of an agreement between the debtors and the covered supplier that deviates from the required minimums. So we've greed to that language. I think that's what it said before but if it will satisfy people --

THE COURT: In any event, these new terms, whether they're the pre-approved terms or one off terms, have to be agreed to in writing by the supplier. That's the point?

MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. From our perspective, the debtor's perspective, and you've couched it as sort of flexibility and good will, but from the debtor's perspective as you know the required minimum provisions include the extension contract for two years, the termination for convenience and other provisions of our general terms being enforceable, the

MNS two payment terms being required as well as getting back to the most favorable trade terms and practices that existed between the debtors and the suppliers in the twelve months prior to the petition date subject to current market terms, supplier waiving the right to seek adequate assurance of future performance, payment of pre-petition cure payments, a limitation of those payments and a treatment of others under the plan and a real definition about what happens in the event of termination or rejection of an assumable agreement or the breach of the agreements and what can occur.

Those benefits to the company, the cure payments are benefit to the supplier -- to the company as Mr. Eisenberg testified -- as we go through this period of addressing product and portfolio and plant rationalization and alignment and realignment and deal with human capital matters over the next period in 2006 having these in place is very important to the debtors because, again, it's the overlay, Your Honor. If you think of this company -- a rationalized stable supply chain that works every day and keeps our customers happy, that's what creates the business enterprise value. The rest of this is how one allocates it towards everybody else and how we rationalize human capital and our plants and portfolio. So that's very important.

In the declarations that have now been admitted into evidence, Your Honor has an indication of the -- and testimony

-- more than an indication, testimony about the kinds of cash flow benefits and liquidity benefits that the estate realizes here. So there are real EBITDA savings, there are cash flow savings. There's additional flexibility and most importantly, and I think from the debtor's perspective the single most important thing of all is there is a stabilization of what the debtor believes to be perhaps one of the most important if not the single most important value driving proposition. A well managed supply chain in this business is what allows us generate business enterprise value for all of our stakeholder and that's the underlying -- this motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't I hear from anyone who wants to speak having heard all the clarifications and changes to the reliefs sought.

MR. LEINWAND: I'm Harris Leinwand representing Baker Hughes Incorporated and Baker Petrolife Corporation.

The debtor says that the vendors objections are not substantial because they will not be bound by this order unless they execute and deliver an assumption agreement. The vendors have asked for something very simple, which is if a vendor should write to Skadden, should write to a particular individual at Skadden which could be designated, that only one person has the authority to sign this assumption agreement. It isn't complicated then for Delphi. It doesn't require lawyers on the part of Delphi to send the assumption agreement to that

person.

We're concerned that someone who -- they're trying to put a burden on the vendors to make sure that nobody signs an agreement if the vendor doesn't want to sign it and that's an unnecessary burden. So we think they're trying to entrap vendors to sign these assumption agreements even if it's clearly against the interest of that vendor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: May I respond, Your Honor?

Your Honor, we're not trying to entrap anyone but we're also not endorsing and would ask the Court not to order a disruption in the day-to-day business relationships between Delphi and its supply chain. An individual supplier has a supply management function and they operate with Delphi every day and they're the ones to determine -- and their CEO could give them direction. They could do whatever they want to when they decide manage their side. But we're not looking to do and we think it would be highly disruptive is to have an outside lawyer send in a thing saying okay, because we're not -- Skadden is not involved in documenting all these things. This is done on a principle to principle basis within the supply chain all over the world.

All of a sudden say and we're to be able to go forward, we want to change the ordinary course of business and we want to impose to a federal court order the only way in

120 1 which something can be signed we think is inappropriate. If a 2 particular supplier doesn't want to sign something, that's for 3 them to manage themselves. We are not trying to change the ordinary course work that occurs in an organization. 4 know how these letters would be generated, who would authorize 5 6 them to be generated, and that's the concern. I don't know 7 whether these -- whether the people who are in this courtroom 8 are hired by the finance side of the group as opposed to the 9 supply side or however they're operating, but I don't think, 10 Your Honor, that this court order should regulate how the 11 relationships occur between those ordinary course business 12 relationships occur between the debtor and its suppliers. That 13 I think is for the suppliers to manage and for them to deal 14 with on their own. 15 THE COURT: So you're not disagreeing with Mr. Leinwand insofar as this, that if buyer X at Delphi who always 16 17 deals with his opposite number at Selectron calls up that 18 person and that persons says well, I'm sorry, I'm not authorized to talk to you any more, you have to talk to so and 19 20 so. That's -- there's no problem with that, I assume. 21 MR. BUTLER: Absolutely none, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: But at least then it goes through the

MR. BUTLER: Absolutely. But if the normal channels are authorized to participate and they do participate as we've

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normal channels?

121 said most of this will occur, we don't want to simply disrupt 1 2 that through a federal court order. That's our only point, 3 Your Honor. Each supplier can manage their own responsibilities. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. FARBER: Your Honor, good afternoon. My name is 6 7 Eugene Farber for DBM Technology. We would respectfully make 8 three points for Your Honor's consideration. 9 Number one, Your Honor, as a matter for the record we 10 do think that Your Honor ought to allow for cross-examination 11 of some of the witnesses who put in declarations before fully 12 and completely determining that they're in evidence. 13 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Everyone has that right. Ι 14 assumed no one wanted to cross-examine him. 15 MR. FARBER: I don't think that, Your Honor, any of us -- the many of us in the back of the room felt that we had 16 17 the opportunity to assert that. 18 THE COURT: Well, you can do that I suppose, but let 19 me hear your objection first. 20 MR. FARBER: Your Honor, there are two points here 21 that appear to us to be very significant. With hundreds or 22 thousands of employees we think that there's not much of a 23 substantive difference between simply saying no signature and a 24 signature from anyone. We agree with the prior comment that 25 we'd like to designate who is the one who should sign.

We also respectfully request, Your Honor, that -- and we don't understand why this is so difficult that those suppliers who've spent the money to retain counsel, to be here today or to interpose objections which have been served before Your Honor that we ought to be served with the assumption agreement. What's going to happen here, Your Honor, is that an employee, probably a low level employee is going to get a document we're told that -- and the form that's been sent us appears to indicate that it's a document that's going to say something has been approved by the Court and we think it's highly likely that without additional language that indicates to that employee please consult your counsel prior to signing this document that lower level employees are readily going to sign and just send it back and thereby bind us.

Your Honor, the final point that I'd like to make which is relevant to that and related is we'd respectfully request that there be an opt out procedure, that we have the right to, as a creditor, to send a notice to all involved, certainly including debtor saying we don't want this procedure. Even if you get someone who will fulfill our obligations contractually certainly as they exist, but we don't want to be forced that if some lower level employees sign something of our many hundreds or thousands of employees that that binds us to an agreement and we'll have a senior official of our company write a letter and say we want out. It's a settlement

123 1 agreement and we respectfully request that we have the right to 2 say we don't want it. 3 Your Honor, thank you. THE COURT: Frankly on the first point given that 4 5 that's the nature of the objection I don't -- I mean you're 6 free to cross-examine, but I don't see any purpose to cross-7 examining, at least as far as my review of the binder and the 8 witness' testimony. 9 MR. FARBER: Your Honor, when we met privately with 10 counsel for the debtor we asked why can't you send a copy of 11 this assumption agreement at the same time it goes out to those 12 who are here today. It's a limited universe. There are sixty 13 or seventy of us. The answer was it's too onerous, it's too 14 difficult to track. 15 We just can't -- we'd like to explore if Your Honor 16 would permit us through the witness and through crossexamination how difficult it would be so that we who represent 17 18 our clients have the ability to give our clients legal advice 19 in connection with what's a very significant binding 20 essentially settlement document. That's the reason, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: I think that can be dealt with on oral 23 argument. 24 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, responding to this. Again, 25 what we're trying to do is permit the ordinary course of

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negotiations to go on between our very sophisticated supply chain and the company and this is not a situation where the bankruptcy lawyers are involved in the process. I mean Skadden is not out in -- with these 800 buyers advising them on how to negotiating things. This is done a principle to principle basis, and if a particular supplier they want to have their outside bankruptcy counsel involved they can do that. gentleman can make sure that they set those rules up right away internally, but to set up a process with these 11,000 contracts they've got to -- those contracts around the entire world have got to bubble up to some central place in Troy and then be sent to the outside counsel so we can figure out who might have shown up in a bankruptcy court and then send out the bankruptcy court and then goes -- this will never be done by December 31st, Your Honor. It seems to me that these sophisticated companies can

It seems to me that these sophisticated companies car in these situations, can manage themselves and they can internally set up whatever controls they want to to deal with this issue but that shouldn't be part of a federal court order dealing with the debtor's procedures on how the debtors will assume something.

Similarly, Your Honor, for the opt out provision, I think it would be very detrimental to set up a procedure where the bankruptcy lawyer is going to start saying there's an opt out unless you contact me. That's not what this process is

125 1 about, Your Honor. 2 MR. ECKSTEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Andrew Eckstein, Blank Rome on behalf of Denso International America, 3 Inc. 4 Your Honor, Mr. Butler refers to this as an ordinary 5 6 course supply chain issue. Perhaps it is on a commercial order 7 and delivery basis, but this is an extraordinary relief and 8 it's an extraordinary deviation from bankruptcy law. This is an assumption of an amended contract. This is a binding waiver 9 10 of rights and it's all well and good for counterparts, business 11 counterparts in the buying and selling of parts to communicate 12 with one another and communicate purchase orders. But to hand 13 somebody what is effectively a material waiver of rights and 14 say you've got to sign this to keep doing business with us is 15 something that should not happen or should not be permitted to 16 happen where somebody expresses a concern that --17 THE COURT: You're saying this a contract of 18 adhesion? 19 MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, in some ways it seems that 20 way. 21 THE COURT: I don't want to hear any more on this 22 issue about notice. I think everyone has made their points. 23 Are there other issues? 24 MR. BERKOFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Leslie 25 Berkoff, Morihat, Cameroff & Horowitz [Ph.]. I'm local counsel

126 for S&Z Tool & Die Robbin Industries. 1 2 I have with me co-counsel Dan DeMarco. I'm going to 3 make an oral application to admit him pro hoc. We will follow it up with a formal application. He's a member in good 4 5 standing of the Ohio Bar, a partner at the firm in -- I would 6 ask you to allow him to speak today. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MS. BERKOFF: Thank you Your Honor. 9 MR. DeMARCO: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate 10 you extending the courtesy. 11 I think it bears mentioning in connection with this, 12 the point the gentleman who preceded me on behalf of suppliers 13 attempting to make is that I would expect that if we have the 14 opportunity to ask the lawyers from Skadden Arps or the Delphi 15 representatives here today who prepared the documents that's referred to the "procedures" and the documents that are 16 17 referred to as the "minimum requirements" and the documents 18 that are referred to as the "assumed or assumable agreements" 19 that we would find that it is not the 600 buyers at the bottom 20 of the pyramid that we heard testimony about. 21 I think the suggestion that have been made by 22 preceding counsel is trying to simply and certainly would be 23 open to other ways to simplify. Your Honor, there was 24 reference made earlier to a meet and confer yesterday at 5:00.

It was assembled within a couple of hours that afternoon by the

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lawyers at Skadden Arps who reached by e-mail my co-counsel, Ms. Berkoff, who filed the objection, myself who -- although I didn't sign the objection was on the paper, they were able to identify me and my partner whose name also appeared on the pleadings. During that call, and I think it's been alluded to here today, thirty some counsel perhaps participated in that call. So the list already exists to provide notice to the suppliers that their designated counsel can receive notice that they're about to be impacted by these procedures.

As a final point, Your Honor, I would like the opportunity to ask, although I think it's rhetorical at this point, the Delphi representatives when was the last time that they sent a normal rollover contract renewal that contained provisions such as the cure under Section 365(b) at a percentage less than a hundred percent which is not back stopped by the protections of Section 503(b). When was the last time such a rollover document contained a waiver of preference rights, when was the last time it included the waiver of any right to adequate protection for the duration of the agreement. I think the answer is evident.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Am I right, Mr. Butler, though that this is really applying as to contracts that are expiring and that if you can get a good deal in connection with other contracts you'll run it by the Committee?

MR. BUTLER: That's correct. These are extensions of contracts that are expiring, Your Honor. Your Honor has in the -- just to give -- to put the point in focus. Your Honor has attached to the order the Delphi standard terms and conditions and if you look at that they are detailed, they are lengthy. They deal with, among other things, one of the most important contractual rights -- debtors here which is a termination for convenience provisions. Those go routinely to these buyers at the other side in the supply chain management and they use their lawyers and their companies to evaluate that.

I just think that if we're going to let the global supply management operation move forward it should move forward through ordinary course business channels and if any particular represented entity here that wants to put -- set up internal procedures to refer everything to outside bankruptcy counsel they can do that, but there shouldn't be an order that requires that entered in this court.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to speak? And you should assume that I read the objections as well as the statements filed in support by the two unions and the agents.

MR. ZIMAN: Your Honor, Ken Ziman, Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett on behalf of JP Morgan Chase as pre-petition agent.

Mr. Butler has alluded to the fact that we also support the relief requested here and especially on the

129 modified basis now negotiated we absolutely do. Maintaining 1 2 the supply chain, we view ourselves as being at the top of the 3 supply chain and Mr. Rosenberg made reference to our money. We'd like to think it's our money until we get paid and we're 4 quite concerned about it going out to pay junior creditors and 5 6 we raised that concern. But on the other hand, we have a lot 7 of confidence in the global supply team at the debtors. 8 They've distinguished themselves in the way they're operated with respect to the essential supplier and the other relief 9 10 entered on the first day and we think that this is the kind of 11 discretion they need to have to maintain that supply chain going forward. 12 13 Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, just as an aside. If Mr. Ziman is correct that it is his client's money being spent 16 17 today everybody in this room is in very, very deep trouble. 18 THE COURT: Anyone else? 19 I have in front of me a motion as modified both last 20 night and on the record today that's captioned order under 11 21 U.S.C. Sections 363(b) and 365(a) in Bankruptcy Rule 9019 22 approving procedures to assume certain amended and restated 23 sole source supplier agreements. We clarified on the record 24 what types of agreements are contemplated by that motion and

the different steps involved in connection with the different

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types of agreements that have been identified.

This is, as the Committee pointed out, extraordinary relief in that it is not a simple assumption motion. I say that because the contracts that are addressed here are being addressed because they're literally expiring and normally if ever does one — abnormally if ever does one assume an expiring contract. So I view this, and I think it should be viewed generally as primarily a motion under Section 363(b) to approve parameters for negotiating the terms of new contracts and the reason that Section 363(b) is particularly implicated here is that one of the parameters involved is the satisfaction of a portion of the non-debtor party's pre-petition claim.

In addition, even though this is not what you would normally view as a garden variety assumption of a contract, the procedures contemplate the release of preference and other Chapter 5 claims with respect to the conforming contracts. So in that sense again Section 363(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9019 are implicated.

In large measure then I need to evaluate the motion in the light of those cases that have considered motions that involve the payment of pre-petition debt and that's what I've done here. I've done I think it in light of the standards of those courts that authorized such payment and in fact I myself have applied those standards earlier in the case with respect to some of the first day motions that were subsequently

reviewed and with some modification signed off on by the Creditors Committee.

First and foremost, I take comfort in approving the motion today from the fact that the two objectants who I believe were asking the right questions have now been satisfied with the motion as far as it's been modified on the record, those objectants being the Official Creditors Committee and Wilmington Trust as indenture trustee.

Notwithstanding Mr. Zeman, they have the most to lose as part of this motion, at least in the immediate sense, because of the payment of pre-petition debt that the motion contemplates and also are closer to the facts than I am and have had the benefit of more discussions with the debtor than I have. So I rely in large part on their judgment.

In addition, I'm reasonably satisfied by the testimony and the proffers that this is a critical time in Delphi's business with the imminent expiration of numerous contracts that gives those contract parties, or at least some of them, meaningful leverage for renegotiation and I believe that in light of that fact the debtors do require a measure of flexibility including the ability to provide for payment of some pre-petition debt and release of avoidance claims in connection with the renegotiation of contracts.

I'm also satisfied generally that the debtors understand that this process is one in which they are supposed

to balance the harm to the estate and other creditors that derives from paying pre-petition debt against the benefits of new agreements and the risks of the leverage possessed by various suppliers. I don't view this, and I think it needs to be made clear in particular to the 660 or so buyers that that - this is not simply a Christmas present that people can hand out to suppliers. I don't believe that's how the debtors have approached the other critical vendor relief that I gave them and one reason for the Committee's involvement is to make sure that -- again, that doesn't happen here but I don't believe that the debtors view it that way from the start.

I think it's important for the heads of the team that overseeing this project, again to make clear that this is not an easy giveaway for the debtor and that in addition to all the other leverage that the debtor has it also has the leverage of the automatic stay and the cases of which there are many which say that it is a violation of the automatic stay to condition a new agreement specifically on payment of pre-petition debt going back to Sport Frame and the cases that follow it.

So I trust and I know that the Committee will be looking over the debtor's shoulder on this, that the debtors and in particular the buyers who will be dealing with the more numerous group if smaller in terms of dollar amount group will be informed by their counsel and by their advisors to consider their leverage points very carefully before making offers even

if there's a general threshold say of 60 percent that they're authorized to go up to.

I would also strongly hope that if there is any significant preference exposure that is also an element of the negotiation because again this is not as I see it a simple contract assumption issue but really an issue of a continuation of doing business and forms of consideration that the debtors can offer up to a supplier in the negotiation for a continuing business.

The bottom line is although I'm approving the motion the authority granted here should be used conservatively and in full recognition of the debtor's rights under the automatic stay.

The objections that I believe remain from the suppliers have gone to the issue of notice and whether the order should provide that the debtors should only deal with or at least should provide a copy of a proposed new contract only to -- either only to or to counsel of record for the non-contract party.

If this were a motion to assume contracts I'd fully understand that, but I really don't view it that way. Again, as I said before, it's really a motion to give the debtor some flexibility in negotiating new contracts. Therefore, I don't believe it is appropriate to engraft on that relief an extra layer of notice which would change it from what it is to

something else. That being said, consistent with applicable non-bankruptcy law, if any of these suppliers wants to notify the appropriate people at the debtor, and I would assume that's the people who are on the side, the buyer's side of dealing with the suppliers. They're perfectly free to do that. It's all a matter of the applicable non-bankruptcy law of authority and agency and apparent authority to enter into a contract.

So if someone wants to get their bankruptcy lawyer involved in a discussion that person can notify his or her counterpart of the debtor that that's what he or she wants to do. If they want to get their regular contract lawyer in part of the discussion, that's fine too, or if they think that they understand the deal that's being offered and to negotiate off of that on their own they should certainly feel free to do that and avoid the cost and expense of adding in a layer of additional legal review.

I note on that score one of the reasons given by Mr. Eisenberg for the need for this relief is that the suppliers have become more sophisticated unfortunately because of the state of this industry and at this point understand terms like pre-petition debt and preferences and the like. Consequently, I think it really is up to them to decide whether they want to involve further layers of review on their end and so notify the debtors. But I don't view this as certainly changing any non bankruptcy law applicable to entering into contracts and if

135 1 someone signs an agreement that extends the term of an 2 agreement for two years I'm assuming they know what they're 3 doing. Similarly, if someone doesn't sign an agreement 4 5 that's sent to them but continues to perform, I don't view this 6 as changing any sort of non bankruptcy law that would be 7 applicable that would say that that course of dealing after a 8 certain time may constitute a new agreement. It may not be 9 this agreement but it may be a new agreement. So this isn't 10 the only agreement that people can be bound by and that's been 11 made clear as requested by all of the supplier objectants. 12 These preferred terms or acceptable terms are only binding if 13 they sign the agreement. So subject to seeing the final terms of the order, 14 15 and I understand you need to circulate it to the Committee and 16 to Wilmington Trust and I suppose to the banks as well, and the 17 objectants insofar as they have an interest still and I assume 18 they do because there are certain provision that you've laid 19 out you're going to be changing to reflect their concerns, I'll 20 approve the motion. 21 MR McDOWELL: Quick question as to the form of the 22 order. 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Who are you, sir? 24 MR. McDOWELL: Ralph McDowell, Your Honor, 25 representing the suppliers.

136 1 Mr. Butler alluded to some changes that came out of 2 the meet and confer with the suppliers last evening and his 3 partner, Mr. Reese circulated a redlined version. Are those changes being included? 4 5 THE COURT: Well, except as he clarified further 6 changes on the record I assume they are, but he will -- if he 7 has your -- are you an objectant? 8 MR. McDOWELL: Yes, I am. 9 THE COURT: I'm assuming that you will circulate the 10 revised order to all of the objectants and again I'm not 11 looking for new objections. I just wanted -- this is really just to make sure it conforms with what's set forth on the 12 13 record. 14 MR. BUTLER: Our process will be we will confer with 15 the bank agent, the Creditors Committee, Wilmington Trust and get the order in the form that we're all comfortable with. 16 17 Then we'll send it out to the rest of the objector list. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Thank you. 19 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, that completes the matters 20 on the November omnibus agenda. Thank you very much. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 23 24 25

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1	I certify that the foregoing is a court transcript from an
2	electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
3	entitled matter.
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6	Carla Nutter
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